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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
• . . special perspicacity is not necessary to be able
to grasp that, in examining normal adult individuals who'-
are representative of the honest, human average, the truly
logical pel sons who are masters of their reasoning power
are as rare as are the truly moral men who exercise their
conscience with all their strength.
Jean Piaget 1
Wiile it is apparent that virtue must be learned, it is not
as clear that it can be taught. Strictly speaking, the question is
one that must remain open. We cannot demonstrate that such a thing
has ever been done, yet neither can we be certain that it has not.
We can, however, establish the theoretical possibility of teaching
virtue. The aim of this paper is to reaffirm such a theory, and to
support it in a practical way by presenting a complementary theory
of learning from which we may conclude that the teaching of virtue
is a psychological possibility as well as a philosophical one.
~>
Plato has provided the logical framework the argument we
need is of this form:
1. Virtue is knowledge of the Good.
2. Knowledge can be taught.
3. Virtue can be tauglit.
That Plato apparently came to modify - one might say compromise -
his position on the first proposition may have been due to growing
2doubt about the truth of the second. Teaching, as it is usually
understood, implies submission by the learner to the instruction or
example of the teacher and the acquisition of new opinions or skills.
But we can gain knowledge only by submitting to reason, and reason-
ing appears to be a wholly independent activity. We may conclude
either that knowledge cannot be taught or that there is another
sense in which to understand "teaching” - one that asks us to use
our reason. In the Meno
,
it seems that we are being encouraged to
draw the second conclusion, hence to appreciate the soundness of the
Socratic method. That no (other) teacher of virtue can be found is
no proof that one might not exist.
Although he himself has called it into question, Plato con-
tinues to favor the opinion (which seems to me correct) that what
can be learned can be taught, provided tlie appropriate method is
used. Indeed, without such an idea there could be no Utopian scheme
like that of the Republic
. But we find there that the second prem-
ise of our argument is qualified in such a way that it might now
read, "knowledge can be taught sometimes." This suggests, not that
Plato is disillusioned about the effectiveness of the method, but
that he has either given up believing or else never believed in the
universal existence of reason adequate to profit from such teaching.
If knowledge can be taught only sometimes, it is because it can only
sometimes be learned.
Having identified the correct means of teaching knowledge,
and apparently having found little improvement in virtue, Plato could
3hardly avoid such a conclusion. That a person capable of reason
would willingly fail to use it must have been inconceivable to
someone who presumed that no one who knew what was right could do
otherwise. And if Plato himself did not allow enough time for the
t
method to prove itself, or if because of lack of acceptance he had
no such opportunity, similar methods have been tried since and there
IS ample evidence that ignorance persists, supporting the opinion
that many of us are not able to reason. The alternative is to liold
that we know innately, or have all somehow managed to learn, how to
recognize the Good, but that we persist in doing wrong deliberately.
Even if this statement is not already a logical contradiction, most
of us would simply deny that human nature is so perverse. We would
rather admit to ignorance than vice.
Yet if we hold any hope for the possibility of a more just
society, it must be based on the belief that we are educable in one
way or another. Rather than relinquish that idea, Plato abandoned
the provisional definition of virtue as knowledge proposed in the
Meno and conceived instead a system of justice based on the notion
7
of a tripartite soul. Now virtue became a question of knowledge
only for those in whom reason was predominant, and who would be
charged with making judgments on behalf of the whole society. For
the rest, whose social virtue consisted in carrying out their prop-
er roles as providers or defenders, true belief would have to suf-
fice as a guide to right conduct. In all cases, personal virtue
still required that the "appetitive" and "spirited" parts of the
4soul be controlled by the rational.
Revised, our argument is this:
1. Virtue is either knowledge or true belief.
2. True belief, and in some cases knowledge, can be taught.
3. Virtue can be taught.
For the most part, this is the basis on which we actually operate,
with a heavy reliance on belief. But the trouble with belief, as
Plato was acutely aware, is its transitory nature. Idiat is learned
by indoctrination can be as easily forgotten, and replaced or even
accompanied by a contradictory idea.
On the other hand, beliefs tliat ought to be revised are some-
times difficult to dislodge. In order to be transferred in a prac-
tical way, rules of conduct must be plirased in such particular terms
that they will demand revision under changing conditions. But those
accustomed to depending upon the judgments of others, still influ-
enced by old threats or pj’omises, will not be changed by new evidence
or argument. Yet neither is it likely that they can be reindoctri-
nated in a uniform way, for there will surely be discrepancies even
among the justifiable interpretations of a given principle. Indoc-
trination may be suited to a small and relatively stable group, loyal
to a consistently wise and benevolent ruler (if one could be recog-
nized as such). But where there is neither such a situation nor the
mediation of reason, the breadth of opinion we encourage seems to
result less in informed growth than in the multiplication of tensions
and animosities, in the course of which the initial significance of
5our beliefs is lost.
Beliefs, when provisional, are an essential step in under-
standing; fixed, they are often pernicious. One response to this
problem is to bypass thought altogether, and to concern ourselves
only with behavior. To do so, however, is to encounter the choice
between anarchy and manipulation. We can leave virtue to instinct
and chance, or else define it as conformity and attempt to influ-
ence behavior directly by means of rewards and punishments. The
latter, if only from a practical standpoint, is a step backward
rather than forward. Because only very specific habits can be
formed in this way, the non-thinking individual is helpless in the
face of change and requires constant direction and supervision. And
again, even if we had efficient technical means of accomplishing
such training - by electronic devices, for example - to whom should
we entrust the programming? In terms of human dignity, such an
answer is simply repellent. IVliile the dangerous illusion of freedom
grows in those uncontrolled by knowledge or principle, actual freedom
is diminished.
The way out of this dilemma is to go back to the original
argument and affirm without qualification the second premise; know-
ledge can be taught. Since it was rejected, apparently, for empir-
ical reasons, I feel it is legitimate to devote considerable space
(Chapter II) to explaining a psychological theory which should
cause us to reconsider. The theory is that of Jean Piaget, who
claims that reason can be taught. If that is the case, then a
6necessary condition for acquiring knowledge can be reinstated.
Then, if it could be agreed that reason and experience together
are sufficient for knowledge, and that both can be taught (pro-
vided we understand "teaching” in the appropriate ways), we could
claim that knowledge can be taught.
As for the first premise, it can now more easily be asserted
that knowledge is necessary for virtue, without seeming to exclude
great numbers of people from this more desirable prospect. In Chap-
ter III, I shall attempt to support this claim; moreover, I shall
agree with Plato that knowledge is indeed sufficient for virtue.
However, the kind of knowledge I consider adequate is more inclusive
than what Plato seems to have required. Wliereas he takes theoreti-
cal knowledge of the Good to be sufficient (though not, in his later
position, necessary), it seems to me that this condition must be
made even more stringent. If we are to carry out our good intentions
in particular acts, we must understand not only the criterion of
right action, but how to predict and control the consequences of
actual events
.
If we are still unable to conclude that knowledge, hence
virtue, can be taught, it should now be for a different reason. The
same limitation would hold whether knowledge of the right principle
or only belief in that principle were used as a guide to right ac-
tion. It is not our ability to reason that is necessarily limited,
but our opportunity to experience. IVhile it cannot be guaranteed
that every individual - even with an ideal education - will turn out
7to be capable of achieving the necessary level of reasoning, it is
quite probable that this is usually so and that there is always at
least a way of maximizing reason. But even if adequate reason were
universal, and each of us knew what he ideally ought to do, we
would still be unable to know what we are in fact doing. Reason,
though necessary, is not sufficient for the ongoing kinds of empir-
ical judgments that the practice of virtue requires, since experi-
ence is never adequate to support such judgments. The problem is
not that theoretical knowledge cannot be taught in certain cases,
but that empirical knowledge cannot be fully achieved in any. Here
we must all rely to some extent on belief.
While it now appears that virtue is not something that can
be attained once and for all, even by the wisest of us, it becomes
instead something that can be approached by everyone, through a
process of continual self-correction. Rather than attributing a
different form of virtue to those who are not yet, or not always,
able to decide correctly what action is required of them (confirm-
ing the suspicion that they can never do so, or simply don't want
to) and then calling such a state equally desirable (thus justify-
ing external control), it seems to me important to maintain an ideal
toward which everyone can realistically strive and progress. IVliile
we are all to some extent subject to the limitations imposed by
ignorance, these need not be compounded by our control of one
another.
My thesis, then, is this: without perfect knowledge, we
8cannot be perfectly virtuous. However, we can learn
- provided we
reason - to be more nearly so. And insofar as virtue depends on
knowledge, and knowledge on reason, and reason on a certain kind of
teaching, then virtue not only can but must be taught, and in a
particular way. With all its qualifications, 1 believe this is a
significant conclusion.
This is the argument I shall defend:
1. Reason is necessary for virtue.
2. Reason can be taught.
3. A necessary means to virtue can be taught.
Chapter II will be devoted to an elaboration of the second premise,
with an explanation of Piaget's levels of intellectual development.
After Chapter III, in which I hope to justify the first premise, I
shall describe Lawrence Kohlberg's corresponding levels of moral
development, and the ways in which they appear to depend upon the
growth of reason. It will be seen that both reason and virtue exist
in what might be called progressive approximations, each derived
from and preferable to its predecessor.
While there is a remarkable parallel between the three parts
of the soul identified by Plato and Piaget's three major stages of
rational development, the crucial difference is that Plato sees the
relevant qualities as more or less fixed (in different proportions)
in three types of individuals, whereas Piaget would consider them
hierarchical, with each combination at least potentially character-
istic of every individual over the course of his development, and
9tending toward the more nearly rational. Formal reason, and conse
quently moral autonomy, can thus be seen once again as universally
legitimate aims of education.
10
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CHAPTER II
REASON CAN BE TAUGHT
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. . . if logic is itself created rather than being inborn
It follows that the first task of education is to form ^
reasoning. The proposition "every person has the right to
education".
. . means, therefore, in the first place,
"every human being has the right to be placed in a scholas-
tic environment during his formation which will enable him
to build until completion the basic tools of adaptation
which are the processes of logic."
Jean Piaget 1
1. Ways of Teaching
The essence of Piaget's cognitive theory is that reason is
not a fixed endowment, but a construction to be progressively devel-
oped. This idea can be contrasted with the view that reason is
qualitatively uniform, and furthermore that it is given, if at all,
in some greater or lesser measure to each individual.
As for the Platonic, rationalist, or apriorist epistemologies,
each believed it liad found some instrument of knowledge for-
eign, superior, or prior to the experiment. But. . . these
doctrines, although careful to characterize the qualities
they attributed to this instrument, . . . neglected to verify
that it was actually at the subject's disposal. Here, whether
we wish it or not, there is a question of fact. (PE: 5)
From his observations of children, Piaget concluded that reason is
indeed present and operating, but often in precursory forms which
cannot be recognized, IVhen teachers themselves are not educated as
to the expectations they can have of their students, educational
efforts may easily be misdirected.
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If it were true that reasoning ability is determined from
birth in respect to both its nature and its degree, there would re-
main only two variables to bear on the amount of knowledge available
to a given person: the data he receives and the way he processes it.
Educational objectives tend to line up accordingly. On the one hand,
there is the communication of ideas, and on the other, the actual
exercise of reason. The picture is slightly complicated by the fact
that each goal may be seen as a means to the other. Ideas that lend
themselves to reflection and analysis may be introduced primarily to
engage the student in decision-making in order to develop in him,
for its own sake, the habit of aggressive, disciplined thought.
This may or may not be seen as a means of further increasing reason-
ing skill. Alternatively, a student may be encouraged to reason
about a given problem in order to gain knowledge - to understand an
idea selected as important, and to recognize its truth in such a
way that certain general concepts become his own.
In practice, although these interdependent purposes have wide
verbal acceptance, neither is very widely implemented in the ways
described. For it appears that many students lack either sufficient
reasoning ability or the willingness to employ what they have, and
furthermore that little can be done to change this. One appears
forced to abandon either a large number of students or else the cul-
tivation of reason as an educational goal.
Wlien the latter occurs, the teacher becomes merely an
instruc
tor, who simply tells what he believes to be the truth.
This is to
13
be remembered, with or without an accompanying set of supporting
reasons, also perfunctorily memorized. An alternative approach is
the experiential, direct discovery method, which often goes on to
take account of the student's personal interests and feelings,
either for their own sake or as a means of keeping his attention.
In either case - whether the teacher or student is the re-
porter of information - the observations in question tend to remain
unevaluated. For even when the importance of the student's own
reasoning is not overlooked, it seems that one can do no more than
hope for its natural unfolding at some predetermined time. Without
the unifying purpose of shared critical judgments, selection of con-
tent appears arbitrary, becoming a subject of dispute rather than
of deliberation. Such a situation can degenerate into one of apathy
and aimlessness in which discipline becomes a serious problem, so
that the teacher is now not so much an instructor as a trainer.
Success is measured in terms of overt performance, with emphasis on
the results rather than the causes of behavior.
Reason can be restored to its legitimate role in the classroom,
and in the larger society, not by retrenchment to more rigorous
methods of selecting an educable blite, but by expansion of our un-
derstanding of wliat can be accomplished through teaching. According
to Piaget, this includes not only the exercise of reason, with quan-
titative growth in both the content of knowledge and in the skill of
using such reasoning ability as one has; we can also count as an
objective the qualitative development of reason itself. One can
14
learn not only to reason better or to reason more, but to use a
better kind of reason. While training and instruction are both
legitimate and important aspects of teaching, if they are employed
without an understanding of this idea the changes that result are
likely to be only superficial. The most appropriate use of any
teaching method is in the service of true education: the cultiva-
tion of inner discipline.
What the teacher may "lead forth" from the child is not only
truth, but universal forms in which truths can be conceptualized
and communicated. If Piaget is correct, these forms will vary in a
systematic, progressive way. While he believes that certain very
general properties of reason are inherent in every person qua
organism, and that these properties remain constant, Piaget claims
that there can also be identified an orderly sequence of epigenetic
changes involving the active construction of logical structures and
their transformation into increasingly useful forms. The level of
intellectual adaptation finally achieved by an individual is
determined neither by heredity nor environment alone, but by the
organizing activity through which he mediates between them.
Since only the order of development is fixed, and not its
timing or extent, the interaction of a child with his experience
can be influenced in such a way as to effect optimum growth, pro-
vided we learn to recognize reason in its progressive forms. The
student can then be encouraged to engage in reasoning at his exist-
ing level of development, to mature at each foundational stage, and
15
finally to progress to the level which is ordinarily considered the
only kind of reason there is. Unlike habits and beliefs, these
changes are irreversible. Once achieved, they provide the access
and the "tether” which makes knowledge, if not permanent, at least
c
retrievable. Although the acquisition of knowledge and practical
skills are worthwhile aims in themselves, they must be considered
secondary to this even more fundamental aim of education.
The next three sections will introduce some of the concepts
essential to understanding Piaget's theory of cognitive development.
In Section 5, I shall discuss further the implications of this
theory for the revision of educational goals and methods.
2. Ways of Knowing
It is not by knowing the Pythagorean theorem that free
exercise of personal reasoning power is assured; it is in
having rediscovered its existence and its usage. ... It
is in learning to master the truth by oneself at the risk
of losing a lot of time and of going through all the round-
about ways that are inherent in real activity.
2
Jean Piaget
Piaget himself seldom speaks of tlie growth of reason, or even
of knowledge, as though either were a quantifiable entity. Rather,
he is concerned with the development of the activity of knowing.
which is interdependent with the activity of reasoning. For Piaget,
"this calculation is sufficient in itself, without our needing to
16
hypostatize its result in the form of 'beings' or 'essences.'"
(BK:318)
With the understanding that "we are tending more and more
today to regard knowledge as a process more than as a state" (PE: 2),
we can distinguish three forms of knowledge, or ways of knowing^
The most primitive Piaget calls instinctive, a "knowing how" which
can be considered entirely non- theoretical
. Instinctive knowledge
takes the form of a few generalized reflex mechanisms, whose primary
value for learning is to initiate the functioning of the organism
according to certain universal rules of organization. But as for
specific "knowledge structured by hereditary programming," such as
perception of color and spatial dimension, "it is debatable whether
it has any real extension." (BK:266) Unlike Kant, Piaget does not
believe the child has an inherent knowledge of cognitive structures
or "categories" by means of which to order reality.
As soon as repeated activities begin to be represented in
thought, instinct is quickly replaced by the complementary develop-
ment of experimental (or "physical") and logico -mathematical
knowledge. These correspond, respectively, to the explicative and
the implicative functions (01:9), or, roughly, to the recognition
of truth and of validity. Experimental knowledge, which provides
the variable content of intelligence, is derived exclusively from
experience of external objects, and with this as a criterion its
acquisition may be considered "authentic" learning. (BK:306) Such
learning, however, requires a pre-existing cognitive framework.
17
knowledge about an object is always an
assimilation into schemata, and these schemata contain an
organization, however elementary, which may be logical or
mathematical. (BK:335) ^
Logico-mathematical knowledge, abstracted from the very activity of
knowing, is knowledge of form. Although this kind of knowledge^, as
available to an individual, undergoes qualitative change, its pro-
gressive structures follow normative laws.
The formation of increasingly adequate logico-mathematical
schemata I take to be the development of what we may call "reason,”
or the necessary condition for the ability to engage in reasoning.
This development, which will be our main topic, will be discussed
more fully in- the next two sections, where it will be seen that
logico-mathematical knowledge is "learned" in a somewhat different
• The rest of this section will be concerned primarily with
experimental knowledge.
Perhaps the most significant thing for the teacher to under-
stand is that experimental knowledge can be acquired only through
the activity of the learner. Like Dewey, Piaget believes that it
is by means of our repeated manipulation of things that we are able
to extract their properties.
Knowledge is not a copy of reality. To know an object,, to
know an event, is not simply to look at it and make a mental
copy, or image, of it. To know an object is to act on it.
To know is to modify, to transform the object, and to under-
stand the process of this transformation. (DL:8)
This activity is not limited to overt action on physical objects,
but may include symbolic or incipient action on theoretical ones.
Experimental knowledge thus comprehends ideas which are transmitted
18
verbally, for it is
. . . acquired by means of physical experience of every type
that IS, the experience of external objects or of whatever
appertains to them, abstraction being made of objects as such.(BK : 266)
• . . this object may just as well be the action of con-
^
scioLisness of an external object, insofar as the information
is obtained by observation or experiment. ... In intro-
spection, the subject as seen constitutes an external object
in relation to the subject as cognitive, whatever "subjective"
errors the latter may make. (BK: 333-4)
Instruction, like training, can be an effective means of education,
provided it is understood that collaboration by the student is
always a necessary condition for learning.
Tlie activity of the learner is initiated and given direction
by his effort to integrate his experience into an existing conceptual
framework. As new observations and ideas are encountered, provided
they are only slightly different from those already familiar, the
concepts being used are elaborated to accomodate them. In this way
experimental knowledge becomes more comprehensive, more differenti-
ated, and more highly organized - in short, more adaptive.
The mind can only be adapted to a reality if perfect accomo-
dation exists, tliat is to say, if nothing, in that reality,
intervenes to modify the subject's schemata. (01:7)
Experimentation, enriched by the communication and "coordina-
tion of measurements supplied by different observers" (BK:337),
eventually results in knowledge which corresponds to a shared real-
ity - a process Piaget calls "decentration .
"
. . .
experimental action is oriented in the direction of
logico-mathematical decentering. . . . Action does not
exclude objectivity; on the contrary, it is conducive to it.
19
since it is extended into mathematical
coordinations provide laws independent
individual ego. (BK:337)
operators whose
of the subject as
It is important to understand, however, that objectivity is achieved
only gradually. Instruction which goes far beyond the student's
existing rational system simply cannot be comprehended, no matter
how well it is supported with facts and arguments.
There is a certain resistance to accomodation caused by the
desire to preserve one's sense of intellectual security, and to re-
inforce and strengthen present concepts through their use - that is,
by assimilating new knowledge into them. Successful assimilation
feels good and contributes to a feeling of integrity which is still
compatible with external reality. Paradoxically, the "egocentricity"
associated with this activity is the underlying motivation for learn-
ing; one expands and adjusts his concepts a little in order to be
able to continue using them. However, experience which cannot be
seen as consistent with customary ways of thinking is denied, either
by being ignored altogether or by being rejected as "unreasonable."
I take reasoning to be the systematic evaluation of informa-
tion - be it sensory data or a verbal assertion - to see whether and
how it can be integrated into an existing cognitive system.
Notion is indeed richer than perception.
. . . Notion does
not consist merely in expressing the perceptive fact but
also (and often especially) in correcting it. (PE:68-9)
New information can be considered learned, hence known, either when
it is recognized as implicit in knowledge already present or when its
admission extends and explains such knowledge. In either case.
20
selectivity which depends upon active justification by the learner
permanently strengthens the knowledge at his command, since it re-
quires continuous assessment and use of existing structures.
IVhen certain aspects of reality cannot readily be assimilated
c
in this way, yet become too insistent to be ignored, successful
adaptation may require that experimental knowledge undergo a major
reorganization involving something more than the elaboration of
specific concepts. The very rules of reason are restructured in
such a way that they both comprehend previous forms and are adapted
to a kind of physical knowledge which is more general, and therefore
more useful in explaining experienced facts. The introduction of a
new rational concept may clear up a whole set of difficulties, and
at the same time it creates new ones by altering the balance of
existing schemata. The continuous reorganization of the rules of
reasoning constitutes the ''learning'' of logico-mathematical knowl-
edge, or of reason itself.
These nales are not at first consciously recognized; they are
implemented long before they are abstracted. New schemes are
"known" when they work and can be put to use.
. . .
structures do not belong to consciousness but to
behavior (only vsfhen there is some sort of dis-adaptation
does the individual become aware of structures, and this
awareness is always quite dim and partial. (STR:99)
Logico-mathematical knowledge is not known by the individual as such,
but by the epistemic sub j ect
,
that is, the "cognitive nucleus which
is common to all subjects at the same level." STR;139) Tliat the
21
individual has a practical understanding is evidenced by his behav-
ior, and not by any theoretical formulation.
• . . the always fragmentary and frequently distorting grasp
of consciousness must be set apart from the achievements of
the subject j what lie knows is the outcome of his intellectual
activity, not its mechanisms. (STR: 139) c.
Learning reason is, again, an active process, but one whose
object is in this case the form rather than the empirical content
of knowing. In order to distinguish such learning from the acqui-
sition of experimental knowledge, I have referred to it as "develop-
ment.” However, this should not be taken to imply that the growth
of reason is merely a matter of maturation - that it is programmed
from birth, or that it cannot be influenced by teaching as well as
by other kinds of experience. Piaget makes the point that a much
better term would be "construction." For we cannot, strictly speak-
ing, say that structures are discovered, since "one can only dis-
cover what already exists, whether it is within or outside one's
person." (BK;318) Neither can they be invented, inasmuch as in-
vention implies free choice.
We are thus compelled to think of the construction of logico-
mathematical structures in the form, not of a development
that is integrated unpredictably with external elements, but
as a kind of endogenous evolution going forward in stages.
These stages are of such a kind that the combinations char-
acteristic of any one of them will be new as combinations,
yet based intirely upon the elements already present in the
preceding stage. (BK;318-19)
In discussing the learning of experimental knowledge and its
relation to the construction of more advanced logico-mathematical
structures, we have assumed the presence of some such structures yet
22
denied that they are innate. But neither can they be drawn directly
from experience of the external world, which would not even be in-
telligible without their prior existence. This is true even of per-
ception, where "cognitive contact with the object perceived is not
cjust a recording or mere 'reading' of experience." (BK:335)
We need hardly point out that, for a copy to serve as arbiterin a case of conflict, we would have to trust it as a true
copy, which would require some other means of access to its
original than through it. (STR:72)
If logico-mathematical knowledge is a distinct way of knowing which
serves as such an arbiter, and if it is in fact also learned, this
learning process must clearly be the primary concern of the teacher.
We shall next consider the origin of logico-mathematical
structures and the general principles of their continued construction.
The following section will describe the sequential forms in which
these structures can be recognized in the growing individual. Finally,
we shall review the way in which reason can be developed in conjunc-
tion with the teaching of experimental knowledge and through the in-
formed use of methods which are already familiar.
3. How Reason is Formed
. . . the progress of reason doubtless consists in an
increasingly advanced acquisition of awareness of the
organizing activity inherent in life itself.
3Jean Piaget
How can we account for the origin of universal logico-
23
mathematical structures? Not through empirical generalization, for
reason is not "out there” waiting to be apprehended. If the laws of
logic applied to the physical world so that they could be
. . . discovered from outside, as the laws of physics arethen there Cvvould) no longer (be) anything "necessary” aboutthem in the deductive and axiomatic sense of the term. If
on the other hand, the laws of logic were universal
they would be innate and would manifest themselves in’ infancy
. . . Now this IS just not so. Their necessity is brought
about by a gradual construction. (BK:315-16)
Moreover, we have seen that some endogenous structuration is pre-
requisite to experimental learning, and cannot itself be "learned”
in the same sense.
• • . it is not comparison that supports generalization, but
the other way around. If, as we believe to be the case, the
unconscious activity of the mind consists in imposing forms
upon content, and if these forms are fundamentally the same
for all minds.
, . it is necessary and sufficient to grasp the
unconscious structure underlying each institution and each
custom in order to obtain a principle of interpretation valid
for other institutions and other customs.
. .
The alternative seems to be that rational structures are in-
herent in the species, at least in some germinal form.
. . . if this knowledge is not brought about by empirical
learning but simply constitutes the necessary condition for
the organization and recording of experience, will it not then
have to be considered ipso facto as being hereditary by na-
ture? Yes and no.
. .
.
(BK:313)
"No,” says Piaget, if we mean well-defined structures that give spe-
cific information. He rejects the "new rationalism” whose search for
the "unconscious structures” underlying thought is represented by
Chomsky's "generative grammar” - a "fixed innate scheme” from which
language is elaborated. (STR: 74-96) Piaget agrees that it is logic
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which is the basis for language, and not the reverse, but denies
that this logic is innate. So it cannot be said that "thought is
the mirror of logic." On the contrary, logic is derived from
thought. (STR:53)
t
... to think is to produce
,
thought being a kind of
"theoretical practice" which is not so much the work of
an individual subject as the outcome of interactions
between the subject and his personal environment
(SIR: 125-6)
Thought, which first occurs as a non-verbal representation of
activity, is in turn prefigured by experience. The first thing of
which the infant is aware is his own movement.
. . . when thought or representative intelligence begins to
function, it starts from zero in its conceptual content,
though not, of course, in its sensorimotor or perceptual
data. (BK:333)
As innate behavior patterns are repeated and coordinated with each
other and with the environment, there occurs the first "splintering
off" of logico-mathematical knowledge from hereditary structuration.
. . . the processes of repetition, ordering, and associative
connecting whereby the sensori-motor schemata become coordi-
nated themselves contain the source of Chomsky's "monoid."
(STR:91)
Thereafter, "logico-mathematical structures fill the same sort of
role at the representational level as do hereditary frameworks at
the initial learning stages." (BK:335)
As has already been suggested, Piaget believes that the rules
for the earliest cognitive structures are derived from the infant's
awareness of the rhythms of his own physical activity, which is ini-
tiated by instinct and governed by universal biological principles.
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. . . though it would not do to say that all vital processes
are "intelligent," it can be maintained that.
. . life is
geometrizing; today we may go so far as to say that in many
respects life works like a cybernetic machine, an "artificial"
or "general" intelligence. (SIR: 114)
It is as general coordinations of actions" that logico-mathematical
knowledge is "already at work in some elementary or immanent form in
every cognitive functioning." (BK:267-68) Its form is
. . . based on the internal conditions of each functioning
(that is, on those general forms of organization which extend
beyond cognitive assimilation and back into the common mech-
anisms, hence, to those processes which lie at the heart of
any living organization).
. .
.
(BK:267)
It is because of the generality of the functional principles
"common to all sensorimotor coordinations" (STR:62-3) that logico-
mathematical forms can be derived from them which are both stable and
adaptable to experienced reality. But the inference directly from
the stability of these forms to their innateness is going too far.
(STR;12) First, it does not really deal with the problem of origin,
for "even when a trait is recognized as hereditary, the question of
its formation remains." (SIR: 89) More important, specific heredity
is as finite and contingent as experience.
. . .
if a priori evolve like some biological characteristic,
being prior conditions for every kind of experimental knowl-
edge and fixed in heredity as instincts or innate conceptual
frameworks, then they must lose, along with their uniqueness
and their universality (since they vary from species [to
species] and are fixated in man as he is now. . . ) the very
thing which gave them their chief value, which was their
necessity. (BK:314-15)
Whereas inherited structures would be "essentially limiting, . . .
the deductive and organizing activity of the mind is unlimited and
leads. . . to generalizations which surpass intuition." (10:2) We
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shall see that
. . necessity, instead of being the prior condi-
learning, is its outcome .
" (STR:62)
Logic can be thought of as hereditary only in the sense that
it is formed within the constraints of "certain necessary and irre-
ducible conditions" (01:3) which are not so much inherited as they
are conserved and perpetuated from one generation to the next. (BK:
313 and 323) It can also be thought of as acquired, but by abstrac-
tion from the experience of internal processes rather than of the
external world.
. . . reason does not evolve without reason; ... it develops
by virtue of internal necessities which impose themselves in
the course of its interactions with the external environment
. .
.
(STR:119)
It turns out that the innatists and empiricists are both partly
right. The source of reason is neither entirely within the indi-
vidual nor outside him, but in the laws governing the concrete in-
teractions that take place as instinctive behavior patterns are
repeated, modified, and coordinated.
The functions which account for the orderly construction of
logico-mathematical structures are the self-regulatory processes by
which every living system conserves itself as a coherent whole.
Reason develops
. . . within the framework of the two most general biological
functions: organization and adaptation.
. . . They are two
complementary processes of a single mechanism, the first being
the internal aspect of the cycle of which adaptation consti-
tutes the external aspect. (01:4-7)
Organization
,
which preserves the inherent balance and unity of the
individual organism, is reflected intellectually as consistency of
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thought. The universal organizing function remains constant
throughout the evolution of the cognitive structures
; although the
child's logic IS incomplete, differing in form as well as in con-
tent from that of the adult, there is always maintained an independ-
ent validity. The nature of the autoregulatory mechanisms employed
will be considered in connection with the kinds of intellectual
structures that are governed by these functions (Section 4).
Because self-preservation by means of self-organizing activ-
ity occurs within a context of change, the individual is also re-
quired to fit himself into a larger order. He must maintain a
successful balance, not only within himself, but at the same time
between himself and the environment that nourishes him. Adaptation
is an active response to the demands imposed by transactions between
the individual and his surroundings, and intelligence - "the equili-
brated form of all cognitive functions" (STR:114) - develops as a
highly effective means of adaptation.
. . . behavior is at the mercy of every possible disequili-
brating factor, since it is always dependent on an environ-
ment which has no fixed limits and is constantly fluctuating.
Thus, the autoregulatory function of the cognitive mechanisms
produces the most highly stabilized equilibrium forms found
in any living creature, namely, the structures of intelli-
gence. . .
.
(BK:37)
Successful human adaptation, or change, is very largely a
matter of achieving this intellectual equilibrium.
Life is a continuous creation of increasingly complex forms
and a progressive balancing of those forms with the environ-
ment. . . . The organism adapts itself by materially con-
structing new forms to fit them into those of the universe,
whereas intelligence extends this creation by constructing
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mentally structures which can be applied to those of the
environment. ... If things perceived or known are a
limited part of the environment to which the organism tends
to adapt, a reversal of these relationships subsequently
takes place. (01:3-4)
Adaptation is the "functional invariant" which accounts for the
tendency toward objectivity in experimental knowledge and for the
evolution of logico-mathematical structures which will accomodate
more and more of external reality. While the laws of organization
regulate the form of knowledge, those of adaptation determine the
fact of learning; "... everything in intellectual development
consists of adaptation." (01:5)
The adaptive process is an equilibration of two complementary
functions: assimilation and accomodation
. In general, assimilation
is the "integration of any sort of reality into a structure" (DL:18),
and this function includes the "furnishing" and reinforcement of
cognitive structures.
. . . in every case intellectual adaptation involves an
element of assimilation, that is to say, of structuring
through incorporation of external reality into forms due
to the subject’s activity. (01:6)
The principle of "functional assimilation" is expressed as a tendency
to repeat familiar patterns of thought and behavior, and to internal-
ize selected aspects of one’s surroundings as fuel for this activity.
Since both the subject and object will have changed slightly with
each exchange, exact repetition is impossible and disequilibrium
occurs. Accomodation is the compensatory, externalizing process
whereby the individual yields and adjusts to the particularities
of each new situation. Accomodation is therefore most closely
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associated with change; more specifically, it brings about learning,
or growth in experimental knowledge.
Assimilation is self-preserving and transforms the environ-
ment; accomodation is truth-preserving and changes the individual.
One must constantly coordinate these two variables by working out
in each case a new reciprocal relationship which both protects
internal equilibrium and expands the scope of possible transactions.
There is adaptation when the organism is transformed by the
environment and when this variation results in an increase
in the interchanges between the environment and itself which
are favorable to its preservation. (01:5)
Such interchanges continue to modify the environment as well as the
subject who is accomodating to it. As adaptive growth perpetuates
itself, both physical and intellectual activity influence the form
and availability of external resources upon which to draw in the
future.
It is worth noting again that the individual always attempts
to keep learning under his control, and spontaneously undertakes the
difficult task of accomodation insofar as it is seen as beneficial.
. . . animals "choose" and "modify" their environment before
submitting to its influences. . . . That is just what beha-
vior is: a mixture of choice from, and effect upon, the en-
vironment, exerting optimal control over exchanges. Learning
is no exception to this definition, for as the living creature
acquires new conditioning or new habits, it assimilates sig-
nals and organizes action schemata that it then imposes on the
environment at the same time as it is itself undergoing
environmental influence. (BK:32)
The chief benefit of accomodation is that it makes possible further
assimilation. The more this is recognized, the less is learning a
reaction to unavoidable intrusions and the more it becomes an active
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striving to comprehend. During the overall course of cognitive
development, as well as within each of its stages, "decentering"
occurs through a shift in emphasis from assimilation to accomodation,
until at maturity they are brought into balance.
c
The egocentricity associated with assimilation and character-
istic of the earliest stages of development is due less to preference
than to necessity. IVlUle the small child clearly must undergo a
great deal of accomodation to the surroundings into which he is born,
there is an even greater need for him to begin by assimilating from
them. This is because assimilation is the source of the first
logico-mathematical structuration.
• . . the function.
. . chiefly credited for the formation
of structures v/as "assimilation," our structuralist substi-
tute for atomistic "association" ....
Psychologically (behaviorally) considered, assimilation is
the process whereby a function, once exercised, presses
toward repetition, and in "reproducing" its ovsm activity
produces a schema into which the objects propitious to its
exercise, whether familiar ("recognitory assimilation") or
new ("generalizing assimilation"), become incorporated.
So assimilation, the process or activity common to all forms
of life, is the source of that continual relating, setting up
of correspondences, establishing of functional connections,
and so on, which characterizes the early stages of intelli-
gence.
And it is assimilation, again, which finally gives rise to
those general schemata we called structures.
. . . Assimila-
tion is the functional aspect of structure-formation.
. .
sooner or later leading to the mutual assimilation of struc-
tures to one another.
. .
.
(STR:71-72)
By means of functional assimilation, innate behavior patterns pro-
duce the earliest sensorimotor schemata, and the coordination of
these schemata is the source of a new and more complex form which
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incorporates and preserves the previous ones.
Indeed, it is not a question of adding another story to an
edifice to which it bears no relation; rather, we have here
a group of syntheses or structurations which, although new
are a direct and natural extension of the preceding ones
and fill in some of the gaps left by them. (PC: 131)
(.
The increasingly complex "materials” for construction of
cognitive structures are furnished through a process Piaget calls
reflective abstraction
. Abstraction is made, not of the properties
of objects, but of the logico-mathematical laws governing actions
performed upon objects.
Examination of child behavior in regard to objects shows
that there exist two kinds of experiments and two kinds of
abstractions
,
depending on whether the experiment is based
on things themselves and allows for discovery of some of
their characteristics, or whether it is based on coordina-
tions, which were not in things but that the action, in
utilizing the latter, had introduced for its own require-
ments. (PE: 29)
A classic example is that of the child who discovers that he has a
given number of pebbles, and that the number stays constant no matter
in what order they are arranged. "Actually he experiments not on
the pebbles, which he uses merely as instruments, but on his own
action of order and enumeration." (PE: 30) In doing so, he enriches
the objects with logico-mathematical characteristics (order and
number) which they did not have independently.
This "de-centering makes the subject enter upon, not so much
an already available and therefore external universality, as an
uninterrupted process of coordinating and setting in reciprocal re-
lations." (STR:139) At higher levels, the structures of formal
reason are abstracted from existential intellectual operations, which
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were in turn derived from concrete experimentation. Progress
through the sequential stages of logico-mathematical structuration
occurs when action is thus "reflected" by being projected onto a
more general plane, i.e. from action to thought, and from "concrete"
thought to abstract. Reflection is defined as "a rearrangement, by
means of thought, of some matter previously presented to the subject
in a rough or immediate form." (BK:320)
Each new construction, while complete and coherent in itself,
is "open" in that it is subject to incorporation into a "stronger"
structure of which it is a subsystem. Following the cybernetic
model, successive forms follow from, and not simply upon, their
predecessors. (STR:134)
This process.
. . takes the form of a succession of levels
of equilibrium, of levels which have a certain probability
which I shall call a sequential probability, that is, the
probabilities are not established a priori.
. . . Each level
is determined as the most probable given that the preceding
level has been reached. (DL:14)
Through the interplay of reflective abstraction.
. . and of
equilibration (self-regulation) mechanisms, which make for
internal reversibility, structures - in being constructed -
give rise to that necessity which a priorist theories have
always thought it necessary to posit at the outset. (STR:62)
Reason can thus progress indefinitely, as it must in order to explain
itself.
From the logical angle, Gddel demonstrated as long ago as
1930.
. . that a system which is otherwise sufficient for its
own purposes.
. . cannot by its own or weaker means, succeed
in verifying its own noncontradiction. (BK:319)
Richer structures can, however, explain previous ones by incorporat-
ing and reorganizing them at a more advanced level of equilibrium.
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Using inadequate forms as content, we can go beyond the limits of
a system
. . . not by generalizing or merely extending it, but by
a stracting from its results an operation that makes possible
construction of a new structure, which includes the old.(.BK:319) c
The adaptive value of logico-mathematical knowledge lies in
its versatility, and this is largely due to the method of its for-
mation. Because "the phenotype, instead of being an uninteresting
epiphenomenon, [is] in fact the outcome of interaction between the
genotype and the environment" (BK:272), there is wide scope for
accomodation to new circumstances. At every level from the genetic
to the intellectual, "recombination exiploits mutation by means of
efficient combinatorial systems," and this process
. .
.
provides an explanation for those vital initiatives
taken by living creatures in the course of evolution, whereas
chance or selection alone offer none (for selection only pro-
duces effects of immediate utility). (BK:279)
Man has the singular advantage of being able to take such
initiatives on a theoretical plane before attempting to implement
them.
No doubt "pure" mathematics does exist, quite free of any
actual application, but it is nonetheless related to objects
of some kind and remains essentially an instrument for
adaptation to the real world even if it goes beyond it
,
(and
because it goes beyond it). (BK:334)
The construction of meaning furnishes the alternatives which not
only enrich human life but make possible its self-perpetuation.
IVliereas other animals cannot alter themselves except by
changing their species, man can transform liimself by trans-
forming the world and can structure himself by constructing
structures; and these structures are his own, for they are
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As each individual recapitulates the progress of previous generations
by a process of "convergent reconstructions with overtaking" (or
regression) (BK:331-33), he is able to profit from their accomplish-
nients but is not limited to them.
4. Stages of Intellectual Development
The characteristic of intelligence is not to contemplate
but to "transform" and its mechanism is essentially opera-
tory. ^
Jean Piaget^
We have said that the development of reason consists in the
construction of increasingly adaptive logico-mathematical structures,
and have described in general terms the "functional invariants"
(organization and adaptation) which persist throughout their evolu-
tion and help account for it. Here we shall consider the structures
themselves, and with them the specific regulatory mechanisms by which
organization is maintained in spite of both internal and external
change. Focus will be mainly upon the "operational" structures which
characterize the appearance of reason on the plane of thought.'
A structure may be defined as a "system closed under transfor-
mation" (STR:6), or a "systematic whole of self-regulating transfor-
mations" (STR:44). The key notions are those of wholeness, transfor-
mation, and self- regulation (or equilibration). Like the living
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organism, which is "in a way, the paradigm structure" (STR:44),
knowledge occurs not simply as an aggregate of independent elements
with their particular attributes, but as a dynamic system whose form
is due to its organizational properties.
t
‘ elements of a structure are subordinated to laws
and It IS in terms of these laws that the structure qua
whole or system is defined. (STR:7) ^
—
The laws which make a structure intelligible are those govern
ing its transformations. Although it need not be temporal, change
is always inherent in a structure.
Were it not for the idea of transformation, structures would
lose all explanatory import, since they would collapse into
static forms. (STR:12)
A structure becomes self-conserving within stable boundaries, and in
this sense closed," when it is governed by laws of transformation
which never lead beyond the system.
Once an area of knowledge has been reduced to a self-regu-
lating system or "structure," the feeling that one has at
last come upon its innermost source of movement is hardly
avoidable. (STR:14)
Such laws maintain the unity and coherence of a whole by regulating
the function of equilibration, that "general formative process in
nature " (STR:113) which accounts for the construction of cognitive
structures. ".
. . the essential function of logical operations. .
is to set up systems of control and autocorrection." (BK:28)
The most elementary autoregulatory mechanisms are the instinc
tive rliythms found in all forms of life. The "reproduction" (func-
tional assimilation) and coordination of "rhythm-structures" results
in sensorimotor schemata governed by "regulations." Regulations
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are partially reversible, probabilistic laws which "depend on the
interplay of anticipation and correction (feedback)" (STR:15-16)
and which are associated with structures whose transformations are
temporal. Practical logic appears at the level of thought with
the construction of cognitive structures which are governed by
"operations." A true operation is a "perfect regulation." and "an
operational system is one which excludes errors before they are
made." (SIR: 15) Because they have the properties of both reversi-
bility and associativity, operations offer the first opportunity to
make informed choices of action. Finally, just as the practical
operations were abstracted from the assimilation and equilibration
of regulations, formal logic is derived from the integration of the
"concrete" operations.
Rhythm
,
regulation
,
operation - these are the three basic
mechanisms of self-regulation and self-maintenance. One may,
if one so desires, view them as the "real" stages of a
structure's "construction," or, reversing the sequence, one
may use operational mechanisms of a quasi-Platonic and non-
temporal sort as the "basis" from which the others are then
in some manner "derived." (SIR: 16)
In order to illustrate how a system is governed by an opera-
tion, it will be useful to consider the mathematical "group" as a
prototype rational structure. (SIR: 19) A group is a system of
elements (e.g. the integers) with an operation or rule of combina-
tion (e.g. addition). It has the following properties: (STR:18)
1. Performed upon the elements of the set, the operation
yields only elements of the set.
2. The set contains an identity element (0) which is un-
affected by being combined with any other element of
the set (n + 0 = n)
.
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3. The operation has an inverse (subtraction) which, when
combined with it, yields the identity element*
(+ n - n = 0)
.
4. The operation and its inverse are associative:
(n + m) + 1 = II + (m + i).
The identity element is essential in order for change to^be
understood as a transformation, "an intelligible change which does
not transform things beyond recognition at one stroke, and which
always preserves invariance in certain respects." (STR:20) Because
of the two restrictive conditions of revers ib i 1 i ty (the inverse op-
eration always makes possible a return to the starting point) and
associativity (the same goal is attainable by alternate routes),
any system having a group structure has an inherent logic.
This self-regulation is really the continual application of
three of the basic principles of rationalism: the principle
of non-contradiction, which is incarnate in the reversibility
of transformations; the principle of identity, which is
guaranteed by the permanence of the identity element; and the
principle, less frequently cited but just as fundamental,
according to which the end result is independent of the
route taken. (STR:20)
The group is an algebraic structure in which reversibility
takes the form of inversion or negation. In addition, there are
order and topological structures. The former have as their prototype
the lattice or network, where reversibility occurs as reciprocity
(e.g. A <.' B transforms into B>A). Finally, there are the topological
structures, which form the basis of geometry and incorporate the
notions of neighborhood, continuity, and limit. These "parent
structures" constitute "three not further reducible 'sources' of
all other structures" (STR:24) which can be be constructed by the
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combination or differentiation of their restrictive conditions.
(STR:25)
Wliile the Bourbaki mathematicians were discovering these
abstract "mother structures," Piaget's study of psychogenetic
c
development simultaneously revealed that
• . . the earliest copitive operations, those which growdirectly out of handling things, can be divided in pre-
cisely three large categories, according to whether revers
ibility takes the form of "inversion," of "reciprocity,"
or of "continuity" and "separation." (STR:26)
He was thus led to conclude that the logico-mathematical parent
structures
. . . correspond to coordinations that are necessary to all
intellectual activity, though they be very elementary, even
rudimentary, and quite lacking in generality in the, earliest
stages of intellectual development. (STR:27)
Logico-mathematical schemata cannot be considered true struc-
tures until they come to be regulated by operations having one of
the three forms of reversibility. This achievement, which occurs at
around seven or eight years of age, marks the third of four major
levels of intellectual growth and constitutes a synthesis of earlier
constructions. At the most primitive sensorimotor level, assimila-
tion schemata are coordinated into schemes for direct action on
reality (e.g. displacement groups, the scheme of the permanent, ob-
ject, inclusion and order structures). (BK:321) During the pre -
operational stage, which begins at about eighteen months to two
years with the appearance of the semiotic function, these practical
structures are internalized and "reconstructed into thought struc-
tures" (BK;321) which can now in turn be coordinated (e.g. the
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concept of number is constructed as a synthesis of seriation and
inclusion). (PE:37-44)
The semiotic function, which makes possible these coordina-
tions, is not limited to speech, but includes imitative and symbolic
actions. Such symbols may take the form of incipient movements,
drawings, etc. as well as images.
Representative intelligence begins with the child's system-
atic concentration on his ovm action and on the momentary
igurative aspects of the segments of reality with which this
action deals. Later it arrives at a decentering based on the
general coordination of action, and this permits the forma-
tion of operatory systems of transformations and constants or
conservations which liberate the representation of reality
from its deceptive figurative appearances. (PC: 128)
Finally, words become the signifiers that follow and re-evoke compre-
hension of meaning. Language allows the child "to reconstitute his
past actions in the form of recapitulation and to anticipate his
future actions through verbal representation." (SS:17)
Representation in thought lets the individual consider a whole
all at once, free of the limitations of space, time, and sequence,
and thus to grasp the concept of reversibility as an instrument of
self-regulation. The period following its appearance is one of
transition from trial-and-error activity to action governed by opera-
tions. In an existential sense, operations are the general acts
(e.g. uniting, ordering) which "enter into all coordinations of par-
ticular actions." (PC:96) By thinking about his o\^m acts of this
kind, the child abstracts the corresponding intellectual schemes.
The construction of an "operational" structure can be illus-
trated by the following example. IVhen a pre-operational child is
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asked to roll a ball of clay into a sausage shape, it is at first
most probable that he will focus on only one dimension (length) or
the other (width), and will treat them independently. In the first
case, he will say that the clay has grown larger, since it is longer.
At some point he will notice its increasing narrowness, and say now
that there is less. At a third stage he will oscillate between
length and width, until at a fourth he discovers their inverse rela-
tionship
.
IVhen he is able to make the compensation necessary for equili-
bration of these two opposing variables, the child has formed an
algebraic structure which has an identity element (in this case, con-
servation of substance) and a reversible operation. (DL:14) The
structure becomes closed because "the relations within it are inter-
dependent and can be composed among themselves without recourse to
anything outside the system." (BK:316) The perceived correspondence
now appears necessary,
. . .and this logical "necessity" is recognized not only by
some inner feeling, which cannot be proved, but by the intel-
lectual behavior of the subject, who uses the newly mastered
deductive instrument with confidence and discipline. (BK:316)
This third level, that of the concrete operations
,
is so called
because the mechanisms being used "relate directly to objects and not
yet to verbally stated hypotheses." (PC: 100) Progress has been made
in that images are now anticipatory, and not simply reproductive of
transformations and their results (PC:74-79), but the child is still
dependent on the figurative, as opposed to the purely operative.
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aspects of his experience. Transformational laws are coordinated
into relatively weak systems called "groupings'- (e.g. classifica-
tions, seriations, correspondences, matrices) which make possible
new notions of conservation. The operations involved are only
^
partly associative, and the structures they form "permit only step-
by step reasoning, for lack of generalized combinations." (PC;100)
Several years are spent in consolidating and stabilizing these new
instruments, which eventually become general and permanent in the
absence of their objects.
During adolescence, the child finally "succeeds in freeing
himself from the concrete and in locating reality within a group of
possible transformations." (PC: 130) This "final fundamental de-
centering" marks the beginning of the period of formal operations
,
which is characterized by the ability to coordinate ideas (including
ideas of actions) by means of propositional logic.
By comparison with a child, an adolescent is an individual
who constructs systems and "theories." The child does not
build systems. Those which he possesses are unconscious or
preconscious in the sense that they are unformulable or
unformulated so that only an external observer can under-
stand them, while he himself never "reflects" on them. In
other words, he thinks concretely, he deals with each
problem in isolation and does not integrate his solutions
by means of any general theories from which he could abstract
a common principle. (SS:6i)
Just as the concrete operations were derived from thinking
about action, formal operations result from thinking about thinking.
The individual can now perform "operations on operations" (PC: 138),
that is, he can reason without intuitive ties to content, forming
arguments about possible truths and dealing with hypothetico-
deductive problems in a systematic and exhaustive way. Long courses
of action can be rehearsed in the mind, and their consequences con-
sidered without the need to act out each step.
Formal reasoning becomes possible due to the synthesis of
previous groupings into a fully associative combinatorial system
which integrates the two fundamental forms of reversibility found
in concrete algebraic and order structures.
Henceforth every operation will at once be the inverse of
another and the reciprocal of a third, which gives four
transformations: direct, inverse, reciprocal, and the inverse
of the reciprocal.
. .
.
(PC: 138-9)
This "INRC group” (identity, negation, reciprocity, correlativity)
is the basis for a richer logic which includes such new operations
as implication, disjunction, exclusion, incompatibility, etc. (PC:
136) Within the system Piaget identifies sixteen such "binary oper-
ations” which can now be systematically performed on all combinations
of two values (p and p^ of each of two factors (p and q) , resulting
in four possible outcomes (p + q, p + q, p + q, p + q)
.
Liberation from observed content represents a significant
accomodation, and a new level of decentration. Autoregulation by
means of "pure” reason is carried out at a more stable level of
organization, and is at the same time far more adaptive in its, flex-
ibility and efficiency. But egocentricity manifests itself, as it
does at the beginning of each new level, in the form of "belief in
the omnipotence of reflection.” (SS:64)
It is the metaphysical age par excellence ; the self is
strong enough to reconstruct the universe and big enough to
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incorporate it.
. . . Equilibrium is attained when the
adolescent understands that the proper function of reflec-tion IS not to contradict but to predict and interpret
experience. This formal equilibrium surpasses by far the
equilibrium of concrete thought because it not only encom-passes the real world but also the undefined constructions
ot rational deduction and inner life. (SS; 64 )
Mastery of formal operations allows the individual to
organize his beliefs in a given area into a closed theoretical
system which accounts for all relevant possibilities and in which
the concept of knowledge takes on new meaning. Given certain pro
visional truths, others can be seen to follow with logical neces-
sity. This most difficult level of logic takes the longest to
achieve, and development through at least three identifiable sub-
stages continues well into adulthood. (See the table following.)
In most adults, full development is never completed.
Average ages at which the various levels of logical develop-
ment typically appear are also given in the table which follows.
It should be clearly understood, however, that the notion "stage
follows age" does not apply in this case, as it does for physical
maturation and perhaps for certain social dispositions (e.g. the
"terrible twos" and the "noisy nines"). Logical stages do not ap-
pear simply with the passage of time, but are definitely influenced
by experience as well as by individual differences in rates of
growth. Since it is not possible to skip stages, but rather to
progress from an already familiar way of thinking to the next most
satisfactory level, the role of the teacher is to provide the proper
experience at the proper time.
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PIAGET'S ERAS AND STAGES OF LOGICAL AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT^
ERA I Sensorimotor Intelligence (ave D- 2 'i '
Stage 1
:
Reflex action.
Stage 2: Coordination of reflexes and sensorimotor repetition
(primary circular reaction).
Stage 3: Activities to make interesting events in the environ-
ment reappear (secondary circular reaction).
Stage 4: Means/ends behavior and search for absent objects.
Stage 5: Experimental search for new means (tertiary circular
reaction)
.
Stage 6: Use of imagery in insightful invention of new means
and in recall of absent objects and events.
ERA II Symbolic, Intuitive, or Prelogical Thought (age 2-51
Inference is carried on through images and symbols which do not
maintain logical relations or invariances with one another. "Mag-
ical thinking" in the sense of (a) confusion of apparent or imagined
events with real events and objects and (b) confusion of perceptual
appearances of qualitative and quantitative change with actual change
ERA III Concrete Operational Thought (age 6-10)
Inference carried on through system of classes, relations, and
quantities maintaining logically invariant properties and which
refer to concrete obj ects . These include such logical processes as
(a) inclusion of lower-order classes in higher order classes; (b)
transitive seriation (recognition that if a>b and b>c, then a>c;
(c) logical addition and multiplication of classes and quantities;
(d) conservation of number, class membership, length, and mass under
apparent change.
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PIAGET’S
ERA III
Substage 1
Substage 2
ERA IV
Inferences
tions upon
of systems
deductive i
Substage 1
Substage 2
Substage 3
ERAS AND STAGES OF LOGICAL AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT
(Continued)
Formation of stable categorical classes. <
Formation of quantitative and numerical relations of
invariance
.
Formal Operational ThouRht (age 11 to adulthood)
through logical operations upon propositions or "opera-
operations. Reasoning about reasoning. Construction
of all possible relations or implications. Hypothetico-
solation of variables and testing of hypotheses.
Formation of the inverse of the reciprocal. Capacity
to form negative classes (for example, the class of
all not-crows) and to see relations as simultaneously
reciprocal (for example, to understand that liquid in
a U-shaped tube holds an equal level because of
counterbalanced pressures).
Capacity to order triads of propositions or relations
(for example, to understand that if Bob is taller than
Joe and Joe is shorter than Dick, then Joe is the
shortest of the three).
True formal thought. Construction of all possible
combinations of relations, systematic isolation of
variables, and deductive hypothesis-testing.
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Even when stages of development are appreciated, diagnosis is
complicated by the fact that there are "all sorts of overlaps." (PP;
171) That the stages appear in an invariant sequence "does not ex-
clude either telescoping or even momentary individual regressions."
(PP:171) Furthermore, there are no clearcut boundaries between' one
level and another. The achievement of equilibrium for one phase
marks the beginning of disequilibrium for the next. Defined levels
are only idealizations of average potential abilities; transitions
are gradual and continuous. Not only is there considerable flexi-
bility in time of appearance among individuals, but there is also
variation in respect to different content for the same individual -
a phenomenon called "horizontal decalage." A person may be at dif-
ferent levels of development for different subject areas, or may
show different levels of achievement in problems that involve the
same kinds of operations.
A related concept, "vertical decalage," can be understood if
we recall the process of reflective abstraction. Because the student
is able to solve problems on the "plane of action" before he can do
so verbally, and because his operations are logical before he can
formulate their logic, the child often understands the subject with-
out understanding the "lesson." (UI : 14 and 96-104)
Practical adaptation. . . far from being an application of
conceptual knowledge, constitutes, on the contrary, the
first stage of knowledge itself and the necessary condition
of all subsequent reflexive knowledge. (PP:162)
That a person knows before he can demonstrate his knowledge is a
warning against too-hasty evaluations, and that he learns by doing
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reminds us of the importance of allowing the student to pursue
internally motivated experiments. The notion of active learning
does not necessarily imply a lot of motor activity, but rather
engagement of the mind in performing an operation on familiar but
problematic objects. (PP:163) By means of actual problem-solving,
involving operations on increasingly abstract objects, we progress
in the construction of symbolic, formal systems.
5. How the Development of Reason Can be Influenced
. . . to understand is to discover, or reconstruct by
rediscovery, and such conditions must be complied with if
in the future individuals are to be formed who are capable
of production and creativity and not simply repetition.
7Jean Piaget
In the introduction, and again at the beginning of this
chapter, I suggested that there have traditionally been two basic
methods of influencing behavior: training and instruction. General-
ly speaking, training is the more direct method, aimed at developing
skills and habits through practice. The teacher may simply serve as
a model for imitation, or he may deliberately intervene in the usual
trial-and-error process by reinforcing the desired performance,
helping to produce a certain association of thoughts and/or move-
ments. l\Tien the student is able and willing to carry out verbal
commands, instruction may be used as an adjunct to training, either
as a cue for immediate response or in the form of a general rule to
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be followed in response to specified conditions.
Instruction need not take the form of imperatives in order
to influence behavior. A teacher can do so more effectively, and
with more lasting results, by presenting ideas which become incor-
porated into the belief system governing the actions of the student.
In altering the content of thought, instruction may not only influ-
ence overt behavior, but may sometimes also stimulate the practice
of thinking. Used in this way, the communication of ideas can again
be seen as a training technique - in this case for the training of
the mind. Ultimately, when used as a means of presenting ideas to
be reflected upon by a practiced mind, instruction contributes to
knowledge
.
The application of these methods to both learning and devel-
opment has already been discussed, especially in Section 2 of this
chapter. Badly used, instruction does no more than clutter the mind
with the transient raw materials of knowledge. Similarly, training,
when undertaken merely to elicit an automatic response, has little
significant effect. Piaget rejects the associationist view of
learning
. . . according to which knowledge.
. . results from
acquired habits without there being any internal activity
which would constitute intelligence as such to condition
those acquisitions. (01:14)
Only when the student, through his own rational activity, organizes
his ideas in a stable, systematic way can we say that true learning
has occurred. Both training and instruction, however, can be used
to supply the conditions under which the student will take the
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necessary initiative. If the ideas that prompt a conceptual reorga-
nization have been received by instruction, or abstracted from be-
havior patterns developed through training, then he has also been
taught - and not simply taught, but genuinely educated. IVhat makes
the difference is not that any special method has been used, but
that the same fundamental methods have been used in a special way,
with an understanding of both the individual child and the universal
way in which knowledge develops.
The schema on the following page seems to me a useful way of
representing the relationships between ways of teaching and the
elements of learning. Here artificially separated, the activities
of thinking and doing must be integrated in order for learning to
take place. IVliile each may be influenced independently, the results
remain superficial unless they can be assimilated into existing
patterns of thought and behavior.
In terms of method, teaching logico-mathematical knowledge
is no different from teaching experimental knowledge. In both cases,
the child needs the opportunity to stabilize his new learning by
using it in various ways and, at the proper time, to expand it by
meeting appropriate challenges. At each stage, his existing level
of development must be respected, so that he is fully in control of
any change. But while it is easy for a teacher to accept that cer-
tain concepts may not yet be present, it is more difficult to under-
stand that some are there in different forms. We cannot assume that
words have the same meaning for the child as they do for adults, or
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that ways of thinking which seem to us naive, Incomplete, and even
contradictory are not coherent and satisfying from his point of
view. (PP : 152-3, 164-5)
Clearly it is not enough to know one's subject. The success
of peer teaching is due to the fact that other students only slight-
ly more advanced can still remember what it was like not to have
grasped the lesson. Furthermore, the young teacher profits from the
opportunity to consolidate his recent discoveries. For the adult
teacher, it is more difficult.
. . . though these views are much more widely accepted today
than heretofore, no great progress has been made in putting
them into practice, simply because the active methods are
much more difficult to employ than our current receptive
methods. In the first place, they require a much more varied
and much more concentrated kind of work from the teacher.
. . Secondly.
. . without an adequate knowledge of child
psychology.
. . the teacher cannot properly understand the
students' spontaneous procedures, and therefore fails to take
advantage of reactions that appear to him quite insignificant
and a mere waste of time.
. . . The best methods are also the
most difficult ones: it would be impossible to employ a So-
cratic method without having first acquired some of Socrates'
qualities, the first of which would have to be a certain re-
spect for intelligence in the process of development. (PP:69)
Even when the relevant pedagogic principles are understood, there is
still the matter of evaluating the status of each student. For this,
traditional methods are inadequate.
The two basic faults of the examination are that generally it
does not give objective results, and it becomes, fatally, an
end in itself. . . The school examination is not objective
. . .
mostly because it depends on memory more than on the
constructive capabilities of the student. . . . The surest
method of diagnosis and of prognosis is certainly that based
on the observation of students and their real work. (L)I:74-
77)
What is most significant here is not the answer to a problem, but
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“To the adult mind this room appears disorganized, but to
the mind of a child everything is logically arranged for use.”
Drawing by G. Emerson
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the way in which the student arrives at the answer he gives.
The rewards for mastery of the "active methods" more than
compensate for the investment. For one thing, there are not the
usual problems of maintaining interest, for while it is important
to remember that the child cares little about the answers to other
people's questions, and moreover has his own criterion of what
constitutes a "right" answer, he is vitally interested in his own
sense of equilibrium. The smaller the child, the less likely he
is to be capable of "heteronomous activity" because of his still
undeveloped capacity for accomodation. (PP:159) However, when
an object is assimilable into his scheme, it is spontaneously
seized upon.
Interest is nothing other, in effect, than the dynamic
aspect of assimilation. As Dewey demonstrated with such
profundity, true interest appears when the self identifies
itself with ideas or objects, when it finds in them a means
of expression and they become a necessary form of fuel for
its activity. (PP:158-9)
Interest is not inherent in any object, but in the use that can be
made of it. Similarly, the "work" of accomodation is undertaken
willingly when new objects are introduced that bear on a situation
seen as problematic by the child. Following the "moderate novelty"
principle, the teacher can sustain interest and growth in a way that
is personal but not private. IVhen the form of affectivity properly
associated with any activity is present - i.e. internal motivation -
it is not necessary to manipulate the child by means of feelings
connected with external evaluations and the giving and withholding
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of rewards. (SS:33-34) Reinforcement of success which is also
seen as personal is far more valuable in promoting development than
is praise for conformity to standards which are meaningless to the
Student
.
c
Attention to the present concerns of the child is as import-
ant in determining the optimum rate of change as it is in choosing
the content of the lesson. From the fact that progress through
identifiable stages can be speeded up, it does not follow that this
is desirable. At each level, the child needs the opportunity to
consolidate and use his new learning, until he himself suspects its
inadequacy and eventually recognizes the need for restructuring.
. . . while everything warns against artificially rushing,
and advises the dedicating of this beginning period, precious
to everyone, to the establishment of the most solid founda-
tions possible.
. . the multiple activities that are necessary
. . . seem to parents like a luxury and a waste of time,
simply delaying that solemn moment.
. . when the neophyte
will know how to read and count up to 20! And so it goes at
each new stage.
. .
.
(UI:82)
The most important implication of Piaget's theory for educators is
not that development can be hurried, but that it can be completed.
Although autonomous intellectual progress is not always ob-
vious, it is far more stable than results obtained by instruction
which provides answers without problems or by training which offers
practice without the opportunity for reflection. The freedom of
activity essential to this method is not to be confused with self-
indulgence. Far from denying the concept of accountability, pro-
gressive education encourages the individual to understand its
meaning by learning first of all to be accountable to himself.
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Without such attention to building the particular cognitive structure
which makes success meaningful, we deprive tlie child of power and
freedom along with objectivity and social awareness. By developing
reason to its fullest potential, the educator most effectively
c
responds to humanistic concerns as well as to the most rigorous
standards of intellectual excellence.
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CHAPTER III
REASON IS NECESSARY FOR VIRTUE
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. . . lack of intellectual honesty may be of a certain practi-
cal use (it IS usually more convenient to be able to contra-dict oneself) and, when scruples about truth finally triumph
It IS certainly not because there has been competition and
selection in terms of utility alone but rather because of cer-tain choices dictated by the internal organization of thought.
Jean Piaget^
1. Recognizing Virtue
Virtue, to the extent that it exists, makes its appearance as
a property of persons. Moral virtue, however, differs from the
usual collection of desirable character traits - tagged by Kohlberg
the "bag of virtues" (ME:59-69) - in that it depends upon motive
rather than manner. Terrible consequences can be brought about with
loyalty, steadfastness, efficiency, impartiality. Although such
qualities are useful, and often necessary, in the service of moral
virtue, we should not be misled into thinking that virtue is consti-
tuted by them.
Ways of behaving, moreover, can be variously interpreted: stub-
bornness may be mistaken for persistence, heedlessness for courage,
flattery for consideration. Moral virtue, on the other hand, should
be objectively identifiable, irrespective of personality. If this
is possible, it is because one set of criteria for such judgment is
to be found, not in the peculiarities of the person, but in those
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of his individual actions. Each action can be isolated, as it were -
judged independently ^ event, then reattributed to an agent, whose
moral worth in each instance rests partly upon that of his action.
A good person is one who actually succeeds in doing the right thing.
His moral virtue is derived, not from the style in which he performs
a right action, but from the fact that he performs it.
There are two kinds of judgments to be made in order to determine
whether an instance of right action has occurred. One concerns the
moral value of the event in question: does it conform to a universal
standard of right? Would an impartial, omniscient observer, aware
of all its consequences, choose to have it happen again? The other
has to do with its status as an action: can this kind of event be
attributed in this way to the person instrumental in bringing it
about? The answer depends upon his reasons for acting at all, and
here we may have to rely to some extent on the agent's willingness
and ability to make them explicit. But we need not do so exclusive-
ly; while not immediately apparent, it can be argued that intentions,
as much as physical events, can be identified by any thoughtful
observer.
^
Because we must depend upon empirical judgments in both cases,
we cannot be certain of either the moral worth of an actual event or
the presence of a corresponding good intention. Yet both kinds of
decisions can be made objectively, using criteria which can be
shared. In order to do so we need to form not only a theory of
action, but also a theory of right action that is universally
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acceptable. Contrary to what we might expect, this can be accom-
plished; where differences occur, their source is not in any funda-
mental disagreement about the kinds of results we consider desirable,
but rather about the reasons why they are desirable. As reason
develops, however, we more nearly approach a common principle by
which to judge whether our common values are being realized. If
mature practical reason were universally employed, actions believed
to conform to that standard would be universally recognized as
tight and those which violate it as wrong. Our remaining differences
would then be due either to our failure to have reasoned at all in
a given instance, or more likely to the inaccessibility of the
relevant information.
2. Right Action
. . .all maxims are repudiated which cannot accord with the
will's own enactment of universal law. The will is there-
fore not merely subject to the law, but is so subject that
it must be considered as also making the law for itself and
precisely on this account as first of all subject to the law
(of which it can regard itself as the author).
T
Immanuel Kant
We can probably agree that in order to be right an action must
at least have good results. It is not enough that it be done from
kindness, or the desire to produce good; it must really benefit
someone. But no action falls outside this classification, since
all are events deliberately brought about, presumably for the purpose
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of advancing someone's interest. If it should turn out that not
all the effects of an action meet our expectations, the mere fact
that It occurs always has at least the immediate benefit of fulfill-
ing some intention.
What is more interesting is that we produce good consequences
at a price, paid always by ourselves, and frequently by others as
well. This need not mean that the necessary means are disagreeable,
but only that they demand an investment of time and effort, replac-
ing other possible good-producing actions. Thus every actuality we
bring about contains some balance of the desirable and the undesir-
able. One must be weighed against the other. The action selected
is right when it proves successful: it has the good results we ex-
pect, and no regrettable ones. We have judged correctly that this
new situation is at least as beneficial as any alternative we
might have chosen.
Prudential rules, the results of a sort of cost-benefit analysis
help guide us in our choices among competing benefits insofar as we
seek to maintain or promote our particular welfare. As skill, oppor
tunity, and imagination increase, we tend to develop a system of
preferences involving a hierarchical arrangement of aims, varying in
duration and intensity, and interconnected by causal relationships.
This spares us from making calculations and choices at every turn,
and from losing valuable opportunities. IVhen two actions are found
to be incompatible, we are usually prepared to sacrifice one for the
other. But prudential norms are always subject to revision in
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response to the contingencies of experience. It is our primary,
ongoing task to maintain a realistic system of purposes, organized
in such a way that we do not undermine our own interests either by
contradicting ourselves or by making plans based upon expectations
that cannot be realized.
Not the least part of keeping both an internal balance and a
stable relationship to the environment is learning to anticipate the
actions of other agents. Because each pursues his welfare in his
own way, and furthermore may change his methods, it is difficult for
us either to influence others or to accomodate our actions to theirs.
But to what extent ought we to do either? Here virtue, as much as
powerlessness or ignorance, constrains us in our choice of action.
We take account of the sometimes conflicting interests of others,
not in order to avoid incurring their opposition, or to discover how
they can be manipulated, but in recognition of their right to exper-
ience good results.
Although consideration for the wishes of others may impose fur-
ther limitations on the range of right actions available to us, the
institution of rules of consideration can also be recognized as a
benefit worth the sacrifice. We recognize our interdependency, and
make a personal investment in seeing justice perpetuated. Miile we
may not adopt these rules only or even primarily out of self-interest,
they are nevertheless always seen by us as compatible with our ulti-
mate interest. Virtue is not the antithesis of prudence, but simply
its generalization. Prudence forbids us to harm ourselves; morality
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forbids us (and others) to harm anyone (including us). Prudentially
right actions produce particular benefits chosen as preferable to
others under a certain set of conditions, thus contributing to the
internal harmony of individual systems. Morally right actions are
beneficial under any conditions in that they maintain a stable'social
environment in which such choices can best be made and carried out.
There is no single time at which a clear, universal criterion
of justice becomes apparent. The notion cannot even begin to occur
to us until we have formed a realistic concept of self as distinct
from other. By reasoning about our experience, we must first develop
what Piaget calls "the scheme of the permanent object." Then, at
first, other persons are seen merely as objects, and valued to the
extent that they are considered instrumental to us. On the other
hand, even inanimate objects may be invested with subjectivity. Our
own preferences are falsely attributed to others
,
and our sympathies
inappropriately spent. The concept of personhood, like any concept,
is only gradually elaborated as we take note of experienced similar-
ities and differences. We make attempts at identification, test
reality, and, ideally, adjust our ideas accordingly until we can
understand that we are similar to all others in some respects and to
certain others in certain respects, and that in some ways each of us
is unique.
The general assumption with which we begin is that we our-
selves, and then those with whom we identify as like ourselves, de-
serve fair treatment. The good is whatever value is perceived as
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held in common. Hence, to the extent that we identify with only
limited groups, we make different assumptions not only about which
individuals qualify for consideration but about what constitutes it.
As we are physically able to expand our associations, however, and
at the same time become intellectually able to accomodate greater
diversity, the group extends to include all possible people, known
or unknown. At the same time, our idea of what is right for every-
body in our group is narrowed and refined. IVhen we ourselves finally
come to value rational choice, we can understand that this is the
only value we can validly attribute to any person, as well as the
only good that can, in practice, be "distributed" equitably. The
opportunity to choose freely is one that can be claimed by every
person by virtue of his personhood, even though the ability to make
wise use of this opportunity may be present only in potential form.
The universal principle which affirms the freedom of each
person to take responsibility for his own course of conduct - "max-
imum liberty compatible with the like liberty of others" (CD:673) -
imposes no particular rules or values. Rather, it allows each of us
to adopt for ourselves any consistent set of values we choose, and
then demands that we act accordingly. It seems to me that this is
the one standard of conduct to which we can all be legitimately held,
whether or not we have explicitly formulated or committed ourselves
to it
.
The implication of this principle is that no action ought to
interfere with any person's effort to maintain the difficult
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prudential balance we have described. This prohibition includes
the act of legislating to others without their consent, for there
is no kind of action which may not under certain circumstances be
harmful to someone, and none which is always beneficial. Just cto
the extent that a choice made by an individual limits the choices
of others can we intervene without his consent to limit his action.
This is in no way to suggest that everyone should be able to
do whatever he desires, but only that he should not be compelled,
except by his own choice, to do something other than what he de-
sires. The power everyone claims for himself whenever he acts -
namely
,
that of doing only as he wills - is also his right. It
should be possible, at least, for him to deliberate, to legislate
to himself, and to follow his own conviction that the action he
performs is more desirable than any he forgoes. The rule can be
stated as simply as "let live," provided we understand "live" as
including ".
. . in a way that is considered worthwhile by the
person in question." (Some would go so far as to extend this
"right" to all natural phenomena. I think the decision might well
be Justified by prudence, along with a certain respect - whether
based on fear or admiration - for the integrity even of inanimate
systems, but that the moral "right" must be limited to considera-
tion for the dignity of thinking beings.)
I do not mean that virtue requires, or even allows, a passive,
laissez-faire attitude. For one thing, I am constantly obliged to
safeguard, by exercising it, my own right to take responsibility
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for the conduct of my life - remembering that I myself am to be
counted as a representative of human dignity, and that self-
effacing submission, though sometimes more convenient than protest,
serves nothing but oppression. At the same time, I must avoid
c
infringing upon the dignity of others, either by doing them out-
right harm or by "helping" them without their prior consent.
Neither does the moral law exempt me from carrying out any
substantive obligations. Although it dictates none, it requires me
to keep any 1 have voluntarily made. The greater part of allowing
others to live and plan freely is not in leaving them alone, but in
letting them count on the kinds of behavior they have come to ex-
pect of us, or at least due warning to prepare for change. Although
1 need not cooperate with others, I will probably choose to do so
by means of both personal and social contracts. Wien I have some
purpose in common with others, we agree upon certain codes of con-
duct believed to be conducive to that purpose and consistent with
our respective interests. Now we are both morally obligated to be-
have in particular ways, not because there is necessarily any inher-
ent good in such behavior, but because we have promised. In the
future, my private goals must be chosen in such a way that they are
consistent, not only with each other, but with my publicly expressed
intentions. Tliese go beyond my explicit commitments, I think, to
include the expectations I lead people to have of me through my
behavior.
Foremost among our rules will be those for the keeping of
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promises - i.e. for acting as though our intentions were unchanged.
Should I decide that a different course of action is better for me
and wish to be released from a commitment, I must give fair notice,
or else good cause why 1 could not do so, and be prepared to pay
whatever penalty might be agreed upon as a reasonable compensation
for non-compliance. If everyone is clear about his particular in-
terest and the available means, then different arrangements can
usually be made which are no worse for those who were counting on
something from me, and no worse according to their judgment. If no
such agreement can be reached, then I remain morally bound by my
original promise, however regrettable, and what might have been a
pleasure now must be done only for the sake of duty.
idiere are times, however, when I must break certain promises -
not because I am physically prevented from carrying them out, and
certainly not because it is inconvenient or even a hardship for me
to do so, but because I find that I have made a pact with the devil -
that I was deceived, not simply about my preferences, but about what
I was really conceding. In the light of new evidence, I simply can-
not continue to intend as I thought I would, even for the sake of
duty. I now have reason to believe that to carry out my original
agreement, regardless of the prudential value of doing so, would
cause gratuitous harm to someone. If I am committed to the moral
law as the only one by which I am categorically bound, then I am
compelled by reason to consider myself released from performing the
action to which I now see that I have wrongly obligated myself. I
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am in fact forbidden to perform that action, no matter what punish-
ment there may be for my failure. The one assumption I am free to
make, with or without the concurrence of my collaborators, is that
obedience to the moral law has precedence over more limited forms
c
of justice.
Since 1 myself am one person whose will is being violated by an
agreement I have made, then in acting to protect my moral integrity
by breaking that agreement I am simultaneously advancing my personal
interest. I may appear to be acting only for that reason, just as
I may appear to be doing in keeping a commitment for the sake of
duty. Nevertheless, I have no choice. To carry out action A, upon
which we have agreed, without being able to intend A would be to
extinguish myself as an agent. To continue to intend not-A without
being able to carry it out is more than I am psychologically capable
of doing. If it is not impossible for us to intend not to intend,
we certainly cannot do so more than once, and in any case it is more
than can be expected of us. IVhile there may be times for having
absolute faith in the judgment of others, we would have no way of
deciding in whom to place such trust if we ourselves never judged
at all. To surrender this freedom would be to reject our moral re-
sponsibility.
When it is necessary to make a decision of this kind unilater-
ally, I think we may be excused from the usual procedure of giving
fair notice if it must be done at an unfair cost to ourselves. IVhen
we do so, it is often because we are compelled by the value we place
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on our integrity and reputation; to misrepresent ourselves by appear-
ing to condone something we do not would be an intolerable deceit.
Beyond this, we may go out of our way to make our situation a public
example, in order to help others avoid suffering a similar injustice.
When it seems clear that no one will be convinced, however, I doubt
that we are required to martyr ourselves for such a purpose.
Keeping promises is one specific kind of action usually agreed
upon as a means of maintaining an equitable social balance. Since
it is likely that every action will make a difference to persons
other than ourselves, hence that none is to be undertaken without
consideration of their choice in the matter, such social contracts
provide the most direct means of assuring their consent. Normally
we ask permission before performing actions of probable consequence
to others, and when we neglect to do so they are expected to speak
up. Yet we cannot always consult those affected by our actions, or
even know who they are. Because of temporal limitations, or because
a person for whose welfare we are legitimately responsible is clearly
unable to know what is good for him, we are sometimes forced to
estimate what someone would choose to have done for him, or would
consent to have us do for ourselves, if he shared our beliefs about
our circumstances and his own. For this reason we tend to rely on
the normative rules developed over time, and in this way prudential
judgments enter into moral ones. We must take considerable care,
however, not to confuse one with the other, or to follow blindly,
on our own behalf or another's, any temporal rule which might
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interfere with individual freedom. In the last analysis, we our-
selves have to accept this freedom, and the corresponding obligation
to justify our choices of action.
We are often mistaken about the kinds of results others want,
c
and almost as often about what ^ want . We make wrong judgments as
to who is capable of deciding what is truly in his own interest.
Such mistakes can sometimes be corrected, if we take seriously the
expressed opinions of those affected, or of those in a better posi-
tion to speak for them. Unfortunately, not all of our decisions can
be corrected or vindicated by the judgment of others or even by the
evidence of time. Even if everyone could agree not only upon a
principle of justice, but about the kinds of actions that would be
consistent with that principle in every case, we would still be un-
able to carry out our good intentions with full confidence that what
we are in fact doing is the kind of thing we know we must. To judge
a contemplated change, most of whose ramifications are not apparent
and some of which may never be, in order to decide whether we should
be willing to call this change our action, we must rely on beliefs
based on incomplete evidence. Even when an action has been performed
we cannot claim that it is right. We can, however, claim that to
the best of our knowledge it is not wrong. To support and expand
this knowledge, we can educate each other about our experiences, and
then use our reason.
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3. Good Intentions
Freedom.
. . is not the absence of causation. Negativelyfreedom is the absence of, or independence from, foreign or
external determination. Positively, freedom is autonomy,
or self-determination. c
Robert Paul Wolff^
If, as we have claimed, moral judgments about persons depend
partly upon the good or bad consequences of their actions, then on
this account alone we are always prevented from knowing that some-
one has acted virtuously - not because we do not know that he caused
a particular event, or even his reasons for doing so, but because we
cannot know all the consequences of any event.
In addition, in order to decide whether someone has acted
virtuously, we must decide whether the event in question can really
be called his action. For even if we knew that a person's behavior
were just in every way, this would not be enough to make him worthy
of praise. Virtue can be confirmed only if the desirable result is
not only caused but intended. I\0ien that is the case, then the per-
son who so intends is responsible not merely as an instrument but as
an initiator, or agent. The event can be called his action, and
judged right or wrong according to the given standard. Even if there
is no such thing as 'free will,' and we are never more than instru-
ments, the fact that we consent to be instrumental in bringing about
foreseeable events, or in failing to cause or prevent them when that
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seems to be in our power, makes us as responsible as if we were
entirely free to choose what would occur.
Because it is so apparent that responsibility depends upon
what we ^ejieve we are doing, it is not difficult to think of the
(.
’acts of will' that bring about voluntary movements as our real
actions, and all that follows as something beyond our control once
we have unleashed the cause. ^ But it is the actual consequences of
our movements that affect others, and to the extent that they can
be predicted by us, they can also be considered "ours." For this
reason, and because it is closer to familiar usage, I have used the
term "action" to refer to physical behavior - but only to physical
behavior of a certain kind: that for which there is a corresponding
intention.
I shall try to clarify what I mean by both "action" and
"intention," and then consider different cases in which a person
appears to be morally right or wrong, and whether in each kind of
situation he deserves praise or blame. I think we will find that
it is not possible to perform a wrong action - i.e. to do the wrong
thing knowingly - but only to perform an action with bad consequen-
ces, and furthermore that when this occurs it can always be traced
to ignorance. The question of assigning blame then turns on the
issue of whether we can be blamed for our ignorance, and my own
opinion is that education is always a more appropriate and useful
response. (Learning does not preclude punishment, and remorse for
having failed to learn sooner may in fact constitute it.) Similarly,
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moral praise is due when an action not only conforms to the moral
standard, but when it is done because the agent believes it conforms
(if not necessarily for only that reason). Again, since virtue
really is its own reward, praise is superfluous, though not unwelcome.
By civil law, a person is not held responsible for the things
he does without the ability to know what he is doing
- provided
either he has no control over this ability, or else it was reasonable
for him to have given it up. The presence of either of these condi-
tions, of course, is debatable, and is at the heart of many of our
perplexities regarding guilt and innocence. But even on the assump-
tion that a person is conscious, of sound mind, etc., and furthermore
has admitted to having acted in such a way as to cause a given event,
it is still not clear to what extent he can be held responsible for
any of its effects and whether he deserves the prescribed rewards or
penalties for them
. The knowledge that he is in such a state as to
be able to act in some way is no assurance that he is able to act in
the right way. Even when he understands and accepts the right rule,
he may be unable to make the relevant connections between his action
as it is conceived by him and the way in which the very same behavior
could be conceived. Because of the limitations of our particular
experience, it frequently happens that we act without ful
1
knowledge
of what we are doing.
The greater part of knowing what we are doing is in under-
standing the causal chain of events associated with some movement we
choose to make, for that movement can be referred to by many
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descriptions, according to its causes and consequences.^ Under
certain descriptions, it can be called an action; under others,
merely behavior. In answering the phone, I am also leaving my
dinner, causing the ringing to stop, letting you know that I am
home (as I promised I would be), making a fingerprint on the re-
ceiver, preventing you from catching cold by going out in a storm
to find me, learning that I have won the sweepstakes, and stepping
on the cat - and countless other things, only some of which I am
aware, and only some of which I meant to do. Although only one of
these descriptions may apply to my uppermost purpose in making
certain movements, it seems to me that any I foresaw, or could im-
mediately have acknowledged if questioned, can also be said to
describe an action of mine, but that those I failed to take into
account, whether they come as welcome or unwelcome surprises or
remain unnoticed, describe only causally related events for which
I deserve neither credit nor blame.
Action, then, is a species of behavior, distinguished by the
fact that it was intended, or preconceived as worth doing, given
the right opportunity. To intend a given action A, it seems to me,
is not only to conceive it as desirable (or to have a "pro attitude"
toward it^)
,
but at least to choose it as more desirable than ‘the
alternative not-A. In some minimal way, an intentional action is
thus also deliberate, and there has been deliberation not only
about the technical possibility of carrying it out, but about its
value. The kinds of intentions to which we are more or less
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committed, including the intention to do what we believe is morally
right, make up the system of purposes mentioned earlier, and are
kept in trust, so to speak, to be drawn upon as the appropriate
occasions arise.
c.
IVlien we act, we recognize both an intention, or the idea of
an action judged as preferred, and the idea of its immediate reali-
zation, judged as possible. If we have only one such intention in
mind, and can think of the corresponding action under only one de-
scription, then nothing more is required for execution than this
awareness, and the simple act of reason by which we relate intention
to opportunity. Barring unforeseen intervention, and with only a
little skill, we are able to begin acting at a very early age. But
it is difficult to imagine such single-mindedness. Very soon, we
have a number of intentions and learn that if we wish to avoid un-
expected consequences it is not enough to acknowledge opportunity.
We must also decide whether it is appropriate - i.e. consistent with
our other intentions - to perform a given action at this opportunity.
The intention that is carried out must have been evaluated and con-
firmed as not only more desirable than not-A, for example, but as no
less desirable than any of our growing repertoire of intentions that
might have been acted upon instead. As we begin to understand causal
connections, we learn to evaluate by whatever standard we hold each
of the foreseeable consequences of carrying out a given intention.
Until we have personally adopted a universal moral standard,
we must rely for our criteria of right action on the rules of those
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we respect. Physical and social dependence lead us to adopt, at
least temporarily, a "morality of obedience."
. . . the formation of the sense of obligation is subject
to two conditions: (1) the intervention of orders given
from the outside, that is, orders of indeterminate time
span (don't tell lies, etc.); and (2) the acceptance of'
these orders, which presupposes the existence of a sentiment
--A gsneris on the part of the person who receives the order
toward the person who gives it.
. . .
According to Bovet,^ this sentiment is one of respect and
consists of affection and fear. Affection alone could not
suffice to produce obligation, and fear alone provokes
only a physical or self-interested submission, but respect
involves both affection and the fear associated with the
position of the inferior in relation to the superior, and
therefore suffices to determine the acceptance of orders
and consequently the sense of obligation. (PC: 123)
To the extent possible, such "unilateral respect" is expressed in
imitation. Beyond this point, "the self of the parents.
. . becomes
an 'ideal self which is a source of coercive models and of moral
conscience."' (PC: 122-3)
One problem inherent in this stage of heteronomy - the fact
that "the power of the orders is initially dependent upon the physi-
cal presence of the person who gives them" - is overcome by identi-
fication with the authority figure. But this identification only
aggravates the more fundamental problem - that of the impossibility
of conforming to the ideal - and leads to dissociation of the .ele-
ments of respect, typically causing guilt, anxiety, etc. (PC: 124-5)
Provided the child can overcome these ambivalences, he enters
the substage of moral realism
,
a preoperatory structure "according
to which obligations and values are determined by the law or the
.V't-''
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order itself, independent of intentions and relationships." Au-
thority retains its concrete quality, however. An order from the
authority figure is taken very literally and is considered binding
even when waived by that person. (PC: 125-6)
Moral realism next leads to objective responsibility
, whereby
. . . an act is evaluated in terms of the degree to whichIt conforms to the law rather than with reference to whetherthere is malicious intent to violate the law or whether the
(PC^lLr
involuntary conflict with the law.
Under this criterion, for example,
... a lie appears to be serious not to the degree that it
corresponds to the intent to deceive, but to the degree that
It differs materially from the objective truth. (PC:126)
Finally, the child begins to move into the stage of moral
autonomy
. IVhereas he used to regard rules as "sacred" and "of
transcendent origin," he now comes to see them as "the result of
agreement among contemporaries" and subject to change by consensus.
This notion is dependent upon the development of mutual (as opposed
to "unilateral") respect. A sense of reciprocity comes about as a
result of social cooperation, most particularly with one's peers,
and "is often acquired at the expense of the parents." (PC: 127) The
idea of mutual responsibility also appears to depend upon the forma-
tion of the concrete operatory structures.
As early as seven or eight and increasingly thereafter,
justice prevails over obedience itself and becomes a central
norm, equivalent in the affective realm to the norms of
coherence in the realm of the cognitive operations. (Indeed,
on the level of cooperation and mutual respect tliere is a
striking parallelism between these operations and the struc-
turation of moral values.) (PC: 127)
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It is at this point that a child can begin to respect an
authority by virtue of his fairness, or the degree to which he
represents the moral law, rather than simply because of his personal
power to do direct good or harm. Children who have reached the
level of concrete operations select "leaders” from among their col-
leagues partially on the basis of such earned respect, and not so
much, for example, on account of size, appearance, skill, or the
opinions of others. (PC: 128) A person chosen as a moral authority
by reason of this more relevant criterion will be willingly emulated,
and if the judgment by which he was selected was correct, he will
enhance development by providing a realistic model. If the judgment
was faulty, he can more easily be rejected than can a parent or other
"imposed" authority, and the rejection in itself constitutes another
step in moral development.
Even if there is no person who commands such respect, by vir-
tue of either position or merit, we can at the very least form a
concept of right action in terms of our individual interests. (One
suspects that in cases where we are dependent upon a strong but
conflicting will, we might do better to be without emotional attach-
ments.) By conforming to practical and political codes, if only for
the prudential value of doing so, we can come to appreciate (or mis-
trust) the general value of rules; we learn how to apply them and,
eventually, to make our own. And although it is more difficult
under these conditions, we can probably develop the concept of equal
consideration in a purely intellectual way, whether or not we have
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ever met anyone who seems to deserve this right.
The main point is this: only when we have learned, in one
way or another, to trust and value our ^ Judgment can we recognize
the universality of human agency. And only then can we appreciate
the significance of the principle which protects this universal good.
Until we are in this position, we cannot be held responsible
either for failing to act for the sake of the moral law or for
deliberately violating it, but only for performing actions whose
consequences fail to conform to that law. Such actions cannot be
judged morally wrong except by others, and cannot be intended as
morally wrong actions. We may, of course, break every kind of social
law quite deliberately, but our doing so is always supported by some
quasi-moral justification we believe is sound. If our actions are
to be influenced, it cannot be done by appealing to a moral principle
we do not understand, and it cannot be done permanently by political
sanctions. Although we intend to do "the right thing," our interpre-
tation of what is the right thing is not entirely free of ambiguity.
Until we ourselves make the correct interpretation, we can hardly
avoid moral error.
IVhen Lt . Galley killed children who had not contracted to
fight, he could not have thought of them as responsible agents like
himself, since it is questionable whether he considered himself
responsible except to his commander. He may have believed he was
doing a right thing in obeying the orders of a superior, even if
the action was not one he himself preferred. IVhen Lord Amherst sent
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smallpox-infested blankets to the Indians, under no orders to do so
but his o.^, he may not have considered himself bound by ^ obliga-
tion other than that of self-interest. If on the other hand he
recognized the moral law, he could not have considered his particular
cause exempt. More likely, he mistakenly believed that his enemy did
not fall under the same law, hence did not deserve the same kind of
consideration he would have shown other gentlemen "of his kind."
Although these seem to be clear instances of morally wrong
behavior, it does not seem that they can be called actions. Lt.
Galley performed the action of carrying out his duty to a legitimate
authority. Lord Amherst performed the action of acquiring territory,
as he was no doubt charged to do, by being a clever tactician. Nei-
ther kind of action can be called morally wrong in itself, and I
doubt that either was understood as a means of doing moral harm.
Although each agent failed to evaluate his behavior and its conse-
quences by a standard that supersedes any obligation to particular
individuals, each could call his action right if he believed morality
meant only conformity to the expectations of others. While we may
feel contempt for people who behave in what we are able to see as
ignorant or treacherous ways, we cannot call them bad, but only
deficient in virtue.
As for those of us who are both rational and either experi-
enced or imaginative enough to understand the moral law, the wrong
we bring about is due to more particular kinds of ignorance. We
make mistakes that harm others in the same way that we mistakenly
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harm ourselves, and having learned the effects of our actions we
are as eager to avoid repeating them, and to make amends if we can.
(This IS not to deny that at times, perhaps because of an important
emotional investment or perhaps because of ordinary cowardice, we
almost deliberately blind ourselves to knowledge of effects that are
quite evident to others. This need not be attributed to selfishness
or maliciousness, however; we do the same sort of thing in breaking
rules of prudence. In either case, the ultimate effect of attempting
to 'bend” reality to our immediate needs is always self-destructive.)
Whether I am acting specifically for the sake of moral duty,
or performing an action I believe to be both prudentially desirable
and morally obligatory, or simply doing what I want in the belief
that it is permissible in both respects, I can easily bring about a
wrong event without intending to do something that is wrong. I may
be blamed for not having known better, but not for being evil. Al-
though my pride is at stake, in that I have either miscalculated or
neglected to calculate at all, my moral education should be relative-
ly simple in that it is only a matter of learning to exercise more
care, or perhaps more courage, rather than of grasping the principle
of autonomy.
When I act with an intention that is not only good as far as
I can determine, but acceptable to others, I may still do them harm
either by failing to accomplish what I intend or by causing something
I did not. Because of my ineptness, I give you bad advice, harming
you as surely as if I had deliberately betrayed your confidence in
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me. At great sacrifice to myself, I agree to give a meal to a
starving man and do so only to discover that he is allergic to it.
I promise my father that I will save the homestead and take care of
him in his last years, but while I am away seeking my fortune he
suddenly falls sick and dies unattended, and the property is sold
at auction. Tragedies great and small, caused by errors of both
commission and omission, can be traced to unforeseen, and often un-
foreseeable, circumstances. Such mistakes are easier to excuse than
those of the non-repentant
,
and all the more so when they are done
with the consent and even gratitude of those being harmed. Our for-
giveness seems to be proportional to the extent to which we our-
selves consider the intended purpose worthwhile, and to which we
ourselves could not have predicted the results under the same con-
ditions. Yet the underlying reason for the wrong behavior is the
same in both kinds of cases; where there is no remorse, it is because
ordinary, empirical ignorance is compounded by ignorance of the
moral law.
We are morally blameworthy only if we knowingly do what is
morally wrong. In order to do so, we would have to act autonomously
in deliberate violation of the principle of universal autonomy.
Unless we failed to count someone other than ourselves as an agent,
it does not appear we could do such a thing. While it is not irra-
tional to make such an exclusion, provided we appeal only to logic.
it is nevertheless contrary to what logic tells us to conclude about
the evidence of our senses. To act on such a false belief would not
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be to act knowingly.
Miether or not we ourselves are able to recognize the correct
moral standard or make the correct judgment about a particular
action. It can be definitely determined that some of the results of
our actions are bad. We, however, are never bad, if we are to be so
judged only by our actions. For our actions are always intended, and
It IS always our intention to do what is right, i.e. to produce good
results. If, in addition, we produce bad ones - either because of
faulty predictions about our chosen means, or because we have not
yet formulated a principle that allows us to cause only objectively
good results - then we are not bad, but mistaken.
If, on the other hand, our actions do prove to be the correct
means of doing good (and no harm), we ourselves need not necessarily
be considered good on that account. The good we cause may be acci-
dental; we make fortunate rather than unfortunate "mistakes.'' I mean
to deceive you, but I am not clever enough; you take it as a joke,
and have a wonderful laugh. I mean only to go about my business, but
in doing so I teach you something that greatly improves your life.
I deserve no credit unless I have intended these kinds of behavior
as my actions, and furthermore have chosen them because I believed
them to be the means of doing only good.
The conditions of virtue are that I intend to do only good
and that I succeed (in the estimation of any informed, rational
judge). In addition, if I am to be credited with my success, then
not only my actions, but all their results, must be believed by me
84
to be good, and I must be correct in my belief. In other words,
everything I do must be an action. While I am unqualifiedly good
to the extent that I act, I am not unqualifiedly good. For I some-
times fail to act responsibly - to take as full account as I might
(.
of the probable consequences of my proposed action in order to see
if they are consistent with my intention to do only what is right,
and then either to incorporate these further results as part of my
action or else revise my intention. Even if I were to take such
responsibility, I could not know - nor could anyone - that I had
made a correct judgment. If I can never be called bad, neither can
I be called good with any certainty that it is true.
But the fact that it cannot be attained is not sufficient
reason to reject the ideal. Although we can only approximate abso-
lute virtue, we can do so more nearly if we are both observant and
thoughtful. We must first be able to carry out instructions to our-
selves - to understand and bring about the idea of an action. But
it is not enough to follow the example of others, or even to promise
to act in specified ways. We are free to act virtuously only when
we know how to promise ourselves to accept responsibility for all
the consequences of any intention we choose to realize.
In order to evaluate our intentions morally and instruct our-
selves accordingly, we must be able to predict the consequences of
our actions (or to recognize the right advice, which amounts to the
same thing). It seems to me that this ability is a necessary condi-
tion not only for conforming to the moral law, or any law, either
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original or adopted, but for formulating the correct moral principle.
Only when we^ reason about possible as well as actual events,
basing our expectations on warranted evidence, are we able to accept
the idea that it is up to us to do so. Because we welcome such
c
prudential responsibility (once we are capable of assuming it), we
want others to show their respect for our rational freedom by fol-
lowing the same principles of consistency and objectivity. But if
they are competent to do so, then they are agents like us, and there
is no way we can justify our failure to grant them the same privi-
lege. It is not just because of any advantage to ourselves that we
reach this conclusion, although there ^ an advantage in reciprocity,
as well as in keeping our beliefs consistent with reality. Virtue
is required by the same kind of reason with which we formulate our
other practical beliefs.
Reason, then, is necessary both in order to understand the
moral law and in order to carry it out. The first needs to be
accomplished only once; the second requires continuous effort.
Since we are usually motivated to make this effort ourselves - or
are at least able to do so - once we have formulated the moral
principle on the basis of our own reasoning, the primary task of
the moral educator must be to help his students achieve a universal
standard of right action, partly by stimulating the general develop-
ment of reason, and partly by encouraging students to reason about
moral questions.
In the next chapter I shall outline the levels of moral
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reasoning developed by Lawrence Kohlberg and their relationship to
Piaget's stages of intellectual achievement. In conclusion, I
shall discuss the general kinds of methods that can be used to
foster moral development.
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CHAPTER IV
VIRTUE CAN BE TAUGHT
... in contrast to a given rule imposed upon the child
from outside, the rule of justice is an imminent condition
of social relationships or a law governing their equilibrium.
Jean Piaget^
1. Levels of Moral Development
We have said that virtue depends on right action: doing the
right thing for the right reason. Moral education which is concerned
only with behavior, however successful it might be in producing the
appearance of virtue, is unlikely to have significant or lasting re-
sults, for behavior alone is not a true indicator of virtue. Right
intentions, on the other hand, are very likely to be followed by
good results as well. It is quite probable that someone who knows
how to set himself a practical standard will also know how to carry
out his purpose in a variety of circumstances, provided only he can
get access to the relevant facts.
Furthermore, since the standard is his own, it is presumed
that he will want to avoid any action that is known to contradict
it, and will correct his mistakes as they become apparent to him.
Once a person has formed the intention of governing his conduct by
the moral law, it can be expected with some confidence that most of
his actions will conform to that law, even though the specific means
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he will choose cannot be predicted. The moral educator, therefore,
if he is to effect any such stable change in behavior, ought to
address himself to the fundamental task of forming right reason.
By "right reason" I do not mean simply correct reasoning, or
the ability to draw valid inferences. Neither do 1 mean the general
intention to do whatever is right, or any specific intention based
on a concrete rule of behavior. Each of these, however, is essen-
tial for the formulation of a sound argument which explains why a
particular action is the right one to choose in a given situation.
Such an argument constitutes a "right reason." In addition, as the
foundation of his argument, the agent must have adopted the correct
principle of moral rightness by which to evaluate the rules to which
his actions, in turn, are judged to conform. To understand this
ultimate, universally binding principle is to have "knowledge of the
Good." Without such a criterion, the explanation "because it is
right" is as meaningless as "because I say so." Only by reference
to a definite standard of rightness can one justify his particular
actions, hence act virtuously.
If we think of an argument for the rightness of an action as
consisting of three "stages," I think it will be easier to isolate
the elements necessary for virtue and to understand both how "knowl-
edge of the Good" can be achieved and why such knowledge is suffi-
cient, if not for perfect virtue, at least as a worthwhile aim of
moral education.
At the most immediate level of moral reasoning, one typically
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argues, it seems to me, in the following way (where K names a kind
of action)
:
1. In circumstance C, I may do only acts which are K.
2. This is circumstance C.
3. This act which I am considering is K.
4. I may now do this act which I am considering.
If class K happens to have only one member, then the act in question
becomes obligatory, and "I may" becomes "I must." Otherwise, the
agent may choose any action he desires, provided it meets the given
standard.
Using a similar kind of reasoning, one selects his actions
from a prudential point of view, using as his standard their intrin-
sic desirability to him balanced against the probability that they
are effective means to his more highly valued goals. A particular
action may be chosen from the' subset of approved actions formed by
the overlapping of those that meet each of the three criteria: de-
sirability, practicality, and morality.
In order to decide how to conform to all three standards at
once, one must be able to perform a rather complicated piece of
reasoning. His more difficult task, however, is to determine whether
conditions C and K apply. No matter how competent he may be as a
logician, he must always base this decision on an empirical judgment,
and such judgments are always a possible source of error.
A different sort of "knowledge" is required in order to de-
termine the "truth" of the first premise, "I may do only acts which
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are K." In order to consider himself bound by a rule for the right-
ness of actions, one must believe that it conforms to his standard
for the rightness of rules. The second stage of his argument is
more abstract (where R signifies "morally riglit") :
1. If I want to be virtuous, I may do only acts which are R.
2. In circumstance C, only acts which are K are R.
3. If I want to be virtuous, I may, in circumstance C, do
only acts which are K.
The sort of reasoning by which we decide that acts of a certain kind
are right in a given circumstance can be carried out at a purely
theoretical level, independent of personal plans and attitudes or the
existence of circumstance C.
Such a rule is still not binding until the condition "If I
want to be virtuous" is removed. However, since it is not necessary
to believe that the truth of this condition is ever in question, I
am taking the position that it is not. Although I doubt that anyone
has ever actually done so, it is as though each of us had argued in
the following way:
1. If I want to be virtuous, I may do only acts which are R.
2. I want to be virtuous.
3. I may do only acts which are R.
It seems to me that we not only want to be virtuous, but believe that
we are. Virtue is simply integrity in practical reasoning, and no one
would choose to think of himself as basing his actions on arguments
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that are unsound. If we fail or hesitate to do K in C, this can
just as easily be explained by the fact that we question whether K
IS really the only acceptable choice, or simply that we have not
stopped to question.
m\en we do so, such questioning should cause us to reevaluate
our concept of R, or the criterion by which we judge the moral
rightness of temporal laws. Wiile we all probably agree that every-
one ought to do what is right or just, and even tend to concur in
our values, hence on the general kinds of actions that can be so
judged (e.g. truth-telling, respecting sentient life, obeying the
civil law, etc.), we may differ in our understanding of why such
actions should be considered right. Reevaluation can lead us either
to formulate a more adequate explanation for our actions, one that
cannot so easily be given up, or else to renew and strengthen our
earlier convictions.
Piaget excludes this "knowledge of the Good" from his three
categories of knowledge, since "metaphysical and ideological" con-
structs
. . . are not kinds of knowledge in the strict sense but forms
of wisdom or value coordinations, so that they represent. . .
cultural superstructures rather than any extension of biologi-
cal adaptation. (BK:268, footnote)
Nevertheless, practical wisdom has in common with experimental
knowledge certain structural features which reflect the development
of logico-mathematical knowledge. As is true in the area of science,
each more advanced stage represents a better psychological equi-
librium - "better" in that it is more comprehensive and more highly
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differentiated. (AP: 1068-69) Each new integration is accepted,
not because it is demonstrably true, but because it is useful in
organizing thought and more adequate in explaining apparent ambi-
guities. It is achieved through a form of reasoning which is at
least analogous to scientific insight and appears to differ from
it only in that the subject matter being reorganized consists of
facts about what people generally acknowledge as valuable, or be-
leive ought to be true, rather than facts about what is believed
to be actually true or probable or possible.
The notion that there is ultimately one correct criterion of
moral rightness is consistent with the research findings of Lawrence
Kohlberg. It is his theory that there are three definite levels of
moral maturity, each divisible into at least two substages, through
which everyone moves in an invariant sequence of development. These
six stages are outlined on the following pages (94-96) in a table
synthesized from two sources (AP: 1066-68 and ME: 71- 72). The fact
that the stages are found to be culturally universal also supports
the idea that everyone believes himself bound by some standard of
rightness. Although not everyone is at the same level of judgment
at a given age or in a given culture, and few ever progress to the
most advanced stages, everyone who is "concrete operational" - i.e.
virtually every normal person over age 8 - can give some kind of
moral justification for his actions.
The six stages of moral development are defined, not in terms
of the extent to which people follow moral rules at all, or according
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LEVEL
I
LEVELS AND STAGES OF MORAL JUDGMENT
BASIS OF MORAL JUDGMENT STAGE
Egoistic interest in
concrete events.
Moral value resides in
external, quasi-physi-
cal happenings (bad
acts) or in quasi-
physical needs, judged
in terms of immediate
personal interest.
1 • Obedience and Punishment
.
(.
Trouble-avoiding set; objective
responsibility. Unquestioning,
egocentric deference to superior
power or prestige, motivated by
fear rather than respect. The
physical consequences of action
regardless of their human mean-
ing or value determine its good-
ness or badness
.
2 . Instrumental Relativism
.
Naively egoistic orientation, with
awareness of relativism of value
to each actor's needs and perspec-
tive. Right action is that which
is instrumental in satisfying one's
own needs and occasionally those
of others. Naive egalitarianism
and orientation to exchange and
reciprocity. Elements of fairness
and equal sharing are present, but
they are always interpreted in a
physical, pragmatic way. Human
relations are viewed in terms like
those of the market place: favors
for rewards. Reciprocity is a
matter of "you scratch my back and
I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty,
gratitude, or justice.
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LEVELS AND STAGES OF MORAL JUDGMENT
Good-boy-good-girl orientation.
Good behavior is that which
pleases or helps others, and is
approved by them. One seeks
approval by being "nice." Con-
formity to stereotypical images
of what is majority or "natural"
behavior, and to the expectations
of peer groups. Behavior is often
judged by intention; "he means
well" becomes important for the
first time and is overused.
4. Law and Order.
Orientation toward authority and
fixed rules. Right behavior con-
sists of doing one's duty, showing
respect for authority, and main-
taining the social order for its
own sake. What the law commands
takes precedence over personal
wishes, good intentions, and con-
formity to group stereotypes.
Regard for the earned expectations
of others, and for earning respect
by performing dutifully.
Ill Responsibility under
universal principles
.
Moral value resides in
conformity to shared
or shareable standards,
rights or duties.
5 . Social Contract
.
Contractual orientation, generally
with legalistic overtones. Clear
awareness of the relativism of
personal values and opinions, and
a corresponding emphasis on proce-
dural rules. Recognition of an
arbitrary element or starting point
in rules or expectations for the
sake of agreement, and of the pos-
sibility of changing laws in terms
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LEVEL
III
LEVELS AND STAGES OF MORAL JUDGMENT
BASIS OF MORAL JUDGMENT STAGE
Responsibility under
universal principles
.
5- Social Contract (continued)
of rational considerations of
social utility. General avoidance
of violation of the will or rights
of others and the welfare of the
majority. Duty is defined in terms
of standards which have been criti-
cally examined and agreed upon by
the whole society. Outside the
legal realm, free agreement and
contract are the binding elements
of obligation. (This is the
"official morality" of the U.S.
government, but is achieved by only
about one American adult in five.)
In Stage 5b there is an orientation
to decisions of conscience, but
without clear rational principles.
6 • Principle and Conscience
;
Autonomy
.
Orientation not only to actually
ordained social rules, but to uni-
versal principles of choice appeal-
ing to logical comprehensiveness
and consistency. These standards
are not concrete moral precepts,
but ethical principles of justice,
dignity, and equality of human
rights. Orientation to conscience
as the directing agent and to mutual
respect and trust. The moral test
of a Stage 6 decision is the agent's
willingness to apply his principles
as readily to himself as to others.
(Socrates, Gandhi, and Martin Luther
King, Jr. are given as examples.)
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to the content of the rules they do follow (i.e, the meaning of K)
,
but by the structure of the reasons they give for adopting certain
common rules or maxims. (CD:671) Using twelve basic moral concepts
Kohlberg finds that all people tend to reach the same conclusion on
a particular issue - for example, that human life ought to be Valued,
or that one ought to obey moral rules. The reasons they give for
these conclusions, however, or for choosing among conflicting values,
reflect an increasingly general logical structure corresponding to
definite levels of cognitive development. For example, on the issue
of "Conscience, Motive Given for Rule Obedience or Moral Action,"
the six stages are represented by the following kinds of motives:
(AP:1068)
1. Obey rules to avoid punishment.
2. Conform to obtain rewards, have favors returned, and so on
3. Conform to avoid disapproval, dislike by others.
4. Conform to avoid censure by legitimate authorities and
resultant guilt.
5A. Conform to maintain the respect of the impartial spectator
judging in terms of community welfare.
SB. Conform to avoid self-condemnation.
The motive for moral action by a Stage-6 individual is not given, but
I take it to be "Conform to avoid inconsistency between thought and
action, as is binding on every agent."
IVhile such principles dictate no concrete categorical rule of
action, they can be used categorically as a standard for choosing
among possible actions under various real conditions. Because they
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are so used by people who tend to share certain universal values,
the legitimacy of the rules designed to protect these values is also
universally recognized. The adequacy of the principle being used
as a rationale for the rules, however, will be questioned by anyone
at a more advanced level of moral reasoning. Because he is abl'e to
understand the less adequate principle as well, he "knows" that he
IS "right." However, he has no common ground for communicating his
reasons - e.g. for convincing a conventional-level conformist, who
has not yet come to trust individual freedom guided by reason, that
his later stage is really more advanced, and not a state of degener-
acy. (CD:672) Since it is on the basis of such principles that we
choose one kind of right action as "higher" than another and give it
precedence in a case of moral conflict, it appears that differences
among individuals, groups, and nations can be resolved, not by teach-
ing the "right" values, but by teaching better reasons for holding
the values we share.
2. How the Development of Virtue Can Be Influenced
In reality, education constitutes an indissoluble whole, and
it is not possible to create independent personalities in the
ethical area if the individual is also subjected to intellec-
tual constraint.
. . . If he is intellectually passive, he
will not know how to be free ethically. Conversely, if his
ethics consist exclusively in submission to adult authority,
and if the only social exchanges that make up the life of the
class are those that bind each student individually to a
master holding all power, he will not know how to be intellec-
tually active.
Jean Piaget 2
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Kohlberg's longitudinal studies strongly suggest not only
that there is a hierarchical sequence of stages in moral develop-
ment, such that achieving any given stage depends on having com-
pleted all previous stages in sequence, but that the ability to
progress from one stage to another is directly related to one's
level of logico-mathematical development. In one study, for ex-
ample, whereas 60 percent of the subjects had attained formal
operational thinking, only 10 percent showed clear principled think-
ing (Level III). Of this 10 percent, however, all were "formal
operational." The conclusion drawn is that "attainment of the
logical stage is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the
attainment of the moral stage." (AP:1071)
The following table (page 100) shows that there is a "point-
to-point" correspondence between logical and moral development.
(AP:1072) It seems quite clear that a major part of teaching virtue
consists in teaching reason: providing opportunities which challenge
students to reach for more highly integrated levels of thought by
means of "reflective abstraction" from the levels at which they are
already operating. With only a superficial acquaintance with the
stages identified by Kohlberg, it is not difficult to see that each
depends upon a previously learned logical skill or concept, while
elaborating and going beyond it.
First, in order to carry out any rule at all, one must be
capable of the simple reasoning necessary to classify an immanent
action as of a given kind, hence to act intentionally. One would
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RELATIONS BETWEEN PIAGET LOGICAL STAGES AND KOHLBERG MORAL STAGES
All relations are that attainment of the logical
stages is necessary, but not sufficient, for
attainment of the moral stage.
LOGICAL STAGE MORAL STAGE
FORMAL OPERATIONS
Substage 3 : True formal thought.
Construction of all possible
combinations of relations,
systematic isolation of
variables, and deductive
hypo thesis- testing.
POSTCONVENTIONAL MORALITY
Stage 6 : Universal ethical
principle orientation.
Stage 5B : Higher law and
conscience orientation.
Stage 5A : Social contract,
utilitarian law-making
perspective.
FORMAL OPERATIONS CONVENTIONAL MORALITY
Substage 2 : ordering triads of
propositions or relations.
Substage 1 : relations involving
the inverse of the reciprocal.
Stage 4 : Maintenance of social
order, fixed rules,
authority
.
Stage 5 : Orientation to inter-
personal relations of
mutuality.
CONCRETE OPERATIONS
Substage 2 : reversible concrete
thought
.
Substage 1 : categorical classi-
fication.
PRECONVENTIONAL MORALITY
Stage 2 : Instrumental hedonism
and concrete reciprocity.
Stage 1 : Punishment-obedience
orientation.
Prelogical thought : sensorimotor Stage 0 : The good is what I
intelligence; symbolic, want and like,
intuitive thought.
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expect that the first standard a child learns to use in selecting
his actions is that of immediate desirability. Next, in order to
forego such an action, he must be able to understand causal rela-
tionships in general, and to see his immediate desire as incompatible
with the means to other more strongly desired events (e.g. avoiding
punishment, or winning the approval of others).
Having learned something about planning, the child is in a
better position to value order as a condition of freedom, and to
choose to follow the given moral or civil law for the sake of main-
taining such order. Since he can now conceive of whole systems, he
is able to "conserve" values as well as physical properties. The
conditions of operational thought (i.e. objectivity, non-contradic-
tion) are also seen as social obligations, necessary for the equi-
table balancing of points of view. The notion of justice begins to
shift from retribution to distribution and from obedience to reci-
procity.
Having "decentered" enough to see himself as a separate
object with a distinct perspective, the child begins to think of
himself as both initiator and collaborator. These complementary
roles are closely related to the appearance of reflective thought.
These two aspects of the behavior that starts at around seven
years (individual concentration and effective collaboration)
. . . are, in fact, so intimately linked that one is hard put
to say whether the child has become capable of a certain
degree of reflection because he has learned to cooperate with
others or vice versa. (SS;39)
At first, the child works out elaborate systems of rules with his
peers, with whom he feels a great sense of solidarity. At the same
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t«e he maintains respect for adult authority outside his domain of
"play .
"
still within the conventional level, there is considerable
room for cognitive growth before this way of thinking can be seen
as inadequate. For example, the ability to carry out a rule like
"Never disobey legitimate authority" requires more intellectual
sophistication than is needed to follow one like "Never disobey your
parents," and this in turn is more difficult than a rule like "Never
run into the street." Only after considerable experience and prac-
tice does one learn to grasp the increasingly complex concepts of
action that fall within conventional morality and to calculate how
to make his actions conform to those concepts.
Finally, m order to move from the conventional to the "post-
conventional, reflective, or philosophic view of values and society"
(AP:1072), one must have freed his thinking from its ties to the
given physical world.
The shift in adolescence from concrete to formal operations,
the ability now to see the given as only a subset of the
possible and to spin out the alternatives, constitutes the
necessary precondition for the transition from conventional
to principled moral reasoning. (AP:1072)
Although the six universal stages of moral development are
neither innate nor inevitable (AP:1058), most people in most cultures
achieve concrete operational logic and a conventional level of
morality whether or not they receive formal schooling. Only about
half of adult Americans, however, reach formal operational thinking,
and of these far fewer become morally autonomous. Having achieved
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the cognitive level that corresponds to a given moral stage, one
cannot automatically move "across" the chart to that stage unless
he has also progressed "up" the moral ladder through each pre-
requisite form of moral reasoning.
What is being asserted, then, is not that moral judgment
stages are cognitive - they are not the mere application of
logic to moral problems - but that the existence of moral
stages implies that normal development has a basic cognitive-
structural component,
. . , While formal operations may be
necessary for principled morality, one may be a theoretical
physicist and yet not make moral judgments at the principled
level. (AP:1071)
One can only speculate as to why moral progress does not keep
pace with cognitive growth. Surely the former is more strongly in-
fluenced by affective experiences and habits and the degree of trust
established between the individual and his society. It may be that
some additional factor such as "will power" or "ego strength" makes
the difference. For example, in a study on cheating Kohlberg and
Krebs found that among the conventional-level subjects who cheated
(55% of all conventional subjects), only 26% had been classified as
"strong-willed," while a definite majority (74%) were "weak-willed."
(CD:672) But it is still not clear that a factor of "will" can be
distinctly separated from the factor of knowledge. On the contrary,
it seems to me that strength of will is directly proportional to
strength of conviction. Both together may result from strong and
consistent reasoning. On the other hand, the will may be dispersed
among vague, contradictory, and loosely-held ideas, or it may be
enlisted inappropriately to sustain a false but compelling belief,
such as the reasonableness of a command made by an authority/security
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figure.
IVhen the "will" becomes associated with a false idea (i.e.
when one has a strong interest in holding that idea), it sometimes
takes great moral courage for us to acknowledge even the simple facts
needed in order to begin to use our reason. In the light of certain
expectations in which we have an emotional investment, we would find
this acknowledgement not just inconvenient, but painful. Standing
behind our failure to act on a principle we would otherwise accept
as right is our inability to recognize a given situation as falling
under that principle. Our lack of right resolve can be traced, not
to an inherent weakness in our character, but to the strength with
which we cling to a false hope or belief adopted under earlier, dif-
ferent conditions when either the facts were not available or we
were not sufficiently rational to see them. Although we may "know"
intellectually what is the right thing to do, we are blinded to the
reality of the situation.
There is an objectivity of fact - not a perfect objectivity
of knowledge - on which ethics must be built, or rot away.
It does not justify intolerance, but neither does it justify
relativism or a moral education that teaches relativism or
implies it.^
A significant part of the empirical knowledge required for the
practice of virtue is self-knowledge, including not only clarifica-
tion of our ideas about what we want, but also of our knowledge about
what we are really doing. As a form of knowledge, it is dependent on
both logico-mathematical development and on the relevant forms of
experience
.
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^e two correlative aspects of the personality are indepen-dence and reciprocity.
. , . The person is an individual
who situates his ego in its true perspective in relation to
the ego of others. He inserts it into a system of recipro-
city which implies simultaneously an independent discipline
and a basic de-centering of his own activity. The two basic
problems of ethical education are, therefore, to assure this
de-centering and to build this discipline. (UI:111-12)
^
Intellectual discipline, as it applies to one's place in a reciprocal
social system, is inseparable from the achievement of psychological
autonomy. One must "de-center," not only in the area of physical
knowledge about the common environment, but correspondingly in his
understanding of how he as an individual fits into that environment.
He must be able to free himself, not only from physical dependence,
but from the powerful injunctions and attributions of his early pro-
tectors, and he must confirm or replace these with independent judg-
ments based on his own observations. If obedience has required too
much repression of personal desires, this process may involve getting
back "in touch" with one's feelings and accepting them as part of
reality. IVhat results is different from Stage 0 morality, however,
since "feeling good" is now only one of several criteria applied to
choices of action, and furthermore one is by now able to "feel" cog-
nitive dissonance. IVhen feelings and thoughts can be freely acknowl-
edged, and the personality reintegrated in a more authentic way, one
learns that he can choose, without external sanctions, not to act on
every desire and opinion.
In addition to personal psychological barriers, there are
likely to be strong social constraints against breaking with tradi-
tion, whereas we are given every inducement to submit to the
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conventional wisdom. Though it means giving up our preoccupation
with our immediate concerns, we learn quite easily to accept the
prudential value to ourselves of making the shift from assimilation
to social accomodation. Even the typical adolescent thwarting of
authority is only a different way of affirming that it exists, 'and
often one simply transfers his loyalty from one person or set of
Ideas to another. Beyond the satisfaction of group Identification,
if we have been treated with reasonable fairness we can also recog-
nize the moral value of the law and the legitimacy of other interests
To be critical of the laws of one's group, and to do so with
reason, is not only difficult in an intellectual sense, but may
require considerable personal courage as well. The transition to
Stage 5 morality, although it is based on an awareness of the concept
of relativism and not simply on its practice, is virtually indis-
tinguishable from Stage 2, Indeed, it is a sort of abstract replay
of the movement from strict heteronomy to instrumental relativism
(the stage Piaget calls "autonomous"). This iconoclasm is often seen
as a considerable threat by those who do not understand that the
revived subjectivity characteristic of this period, which may appear
as selfishness and lawlessness, really indicates the beginning of a
new and enlightened sense of individual responsibility. To the
Stage 3 thinker, who cannot understand a way of thinking so far
beyond his own, the young person appears to be at Stage 2. It is
interesting that each has reason to think of the other as less mature
than himself.
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In the face of these pressures for conformity, both from the
people who are important to us and from our social institutions, few
of us form the habit of addressing ourselves to moral issues unless
forced to do so by a critical situation. Kohlberg has found, how-
ever. that progress can be made by exposing a student to a situation
of moral conflict "for which his principles have no ready solution,"
and then to discussions about this situation with other students who
are at the next higher level and whose arguments are then supported
and clarified by the teacher. (ME: 82)
children and adolescents rank as
hllT reasoning they can compre-end. Children comprehend all lower stages than their own
and often comprehend the stage one higher than their own and
occasionally two stages higher, though they cannot actively
express these higher stages of thought. If they comprehend
the stage one higher than their own, they tend to prefer it
to their own.
. . . While it may be felt as dangerous, the
moral leadership of the Platonic philosopher-ruler is none-
the less naturally felt. ... The child's preference for
the next level of thought shows that it is greeted as already
f^iliar, that it is felt to be a more adequate expression
of that already within, of that latent in the child's own
thought. If the child were responding to fine words and ex-
ternal prestige he would not pick the next stage continuous
with his own, but something else. (ME:80)
Movement out of the conventional stage is probably hindered by the
fact that there are fewer opportunities to engage in such discussion
and to hear such clarification, and fewer personal crises which re-
quire us to deal with moral issues at this level.
The transition to Level III usually begins, if at all, in
late adolescence, and it is eventually resolved, in early adulthood,
at a more highly principled moral stage. (AP: 1072-81) If achieved,
this new stage represents a more satisfactory balancing of personal
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and social concerns which enables the young person to see himself
as both powerful and responsible, more fully in control of his life.
We may take some encouragement in Kohlberg's finding that "a larger
proportion of youths (are) at the principled level today than was
the case in their fathers' day." At the same time, however, more
are at the preconventional level. The current weakening of conven-
tional morality, interpreted by some as a sign of moral decay, can
indeed lead to "fixation at the preconventional level." Yet the
same situation represents an opportunity for the development of
principled thinking. "Given this state, moral and civic education
in the schools becomes a more urgent task." (CD:674-5)
While moral growth depends on no specific knowledge or ex-
perience, an experience of a certain kind may be needed as the
motivation for resolving a certain kind of dilemma. Both moral and
intellectual growth appear to depend largely if not exclusively upon
the opportunity to respond to appropriate moral and intellectual
challenges by restructuring one's values or knowledge. The word
"appropriate" is most significant, since it is as much a mistake to
assume that an individual is capable of solving a problem well beyond
his level of development as it is to assume that he can never do so.
Tlie aristocratic tracking system. . . rested on the assumption
that the capacity for abstract thought is all or none, that
it appears at a fixed age, and that it is hereditarily limited
to an elite group in the population.
. . . However, when
democratic secondary education ignored the existence of the
adolescent cognitive shift and individual differences in their
attainment, real difficulties emerged. . . . Clearly the new
curricula assumed formal-operational thought, rather than
attempting to develop it. (AP:1082)
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Kohlberg advocates instead "progressive" education, where develop-
ment takes precedence over achievement and is stimulated by "pro-
viding opportunities for active thought and active organization of
experience." (AP:1083) He recommends to us the philosophy of Dewey
:
whiS'win'LaM^rh*^
the work of supplying the conditionsich will en ble the psychical functions, as they succes-sively arise, to mature and pass into higher functions inthe freest and fullest manner, 4
An important implication of this philosophy is that the learn-
ing atmosphere must be immediately meaningful to the student. Often
this means taking advantage of opportunities as they present them-
selves, even if doing so is disruptive of the planned routine. Dewey,
Piaget, and Kohlberg would all endorse the following view:
Moral education is education for citizenship, for mature life,
and is exactly like vocational education in that it will be
useful exactly to the degree that it faces real-life problems -
and that means controversy.^
"Intellect" should not be opposed to "life." (AP:1083) If such a
separation tends to occur in the realm of experimental knowledge,
there is an even stronger tendency to contrast the moral with the
practical, rather than seeing morality simply as a more comprehensive
form of practical reasoning which considers the relationship of any
action to the possible prudential interests of any person.
Although movement to higher moral levels increasingly takes
account of a wider and more varied universe of individuals, one need
not give up valuing himself or the groups with which he is closely
associated. On the contrary, he accepts each new principle because
he sees it as a more adequate reason for the equitable treatment of
no
himself and his broadening circle of peers. Pluralism need not be
seen as an argument for relativism; rather, appreciation of diverse
points of view can lead us to formulate more comprehensive, objec-
tive moral principles. In this connection, Kohlberg has found that
one of the conditions favorable to moral growth is the opportunity
for role-taking, or a norm which encourages the child to take the
point of view of others. (CD:676)
Similarly, moral growth is affected in a positive way by the
extent to which the institution takes the point of view of the child.
The second dimension of social atmosphere, more strictly
moral, is the level of justice of the environment or insti-
tution.
. . . This structure may exist or be perceived at
any of our moral stages. (CD:676)
Kohlberg postulates that "a higher level of institutional justice
is a condition for individual development of a higher sense of jus-
tice.” (CD:676) It seems quite clear that a participatory demo-
cracy provides the best opportunity both for role-taking and for
making thoughtful choices, the results of which are heard.
Although we cannot always approve or allow certain kinds of
behavior, it is essential to show respect for the reasons a child
gives for his actions or for his desire to act in a certain way.
We often find that the reasons are not so much wrong as they are
only partially right. Without some opportunity to express, if not
act upon, his own principles when they fall short of convention, the
child cannot be expected to do so when they go beyond it.
In the same way that a kind of contradiction exists in
adhering to an intellectual truth from outside (without
having rediscovered and reverified it)
,
so it can be asked
Ill
**Thank you for coming. The talks were forthright and
useful, and frennded an excellent climate in which to
resolve our remaining differerscesT
Drawing by B. Tobey ; 1976
The Mew Yorker Magazine, Tnc.
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whether there does not exist some moral inconstancy in
recognizing a duty without having come to it by an inde-
pendent method. (UI;118)
Does (not) the right of ethical education, as in the forma-
tion of the mind, mean a right truly to construct or at
least to participate in the elaboration of the discipline
that will obligate those very same persons who collaborated
in this elaboration? (UI:51)
Maintaining the ideal atmosphere in which to consider moral
or intellectual dilemmas is clearly the more difficult requirement.
Not every institution administers just rules in a just way.
In the logic of the system the student's intellectual and
moral activity remains heteronomous because it is inseparable
from a continual constraint exercised by the teacher, even
though that constraint may remain unperceived by the student
or be accepted by him of his own free will. (PP:151)
Moreover, parents and others are eager to see evidence of progress
in the form of behavior, not in reasons for behavior; the fact of
inner growth is seldom immediately apparent.
The difficulty of implementing these recommendations, however,
is not in question; the only legitimate question is whether or not
they work to bring about intellectual growth. Until such methods
have been more fully studied and tried, there is no reason to be-
lieve they do not work, and considerable evidence that they do.
Furthermore, there is some reason to suppose that "knowledge
of the Good" or practical wisdom, if it can be achieved, insures
virtue insofar as virtue is ever achievable. The person who is
sufficiently rational to understand Stage-6 morality is also reason-
able enough to be able to obtain the kind of knowledge that bears
upon his principles, and the strength of his reason is available
to
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induce him to use that ability to take an objective view of reality.
Since both the principles and the knowledge are his own, we can
expect him to carry out the kinds of actions dictated by them.
Since both are right, to the extent that either can be known by him
to be right, we can expect that most of his actions will be right
also
.
IVhile we may not be able to give convincing support for the
sufficiency of reason, we cannot deny its necessity.
Since moral reasoning clearly is reasoning, advanced moral
reasoning depends upon advanced logical reasoning; a
person's logical stage puts a certain ceiling on the moral
stage he can attain. (CD:671)
Kohlberg gives three reasons for advocating the cognitive-develop-
mental approach to moral education. First, although moral judgment
is only one factor in moral behavior, it is "the single most import-
ant factor yet discovered in moral behavior." Second, it is the
"only distinctively moral factor," and accounts for the crucial dif-
ference in behavior when other factors, such as "ego strength," are
constant
.
To illustrate, we noted that the Krebs study indicated that
"strong-willed" conventional stage subjects resisted cheating
more than "weak-willed" subjects. For those at a preconven-
tional level of moral reasoning, however, "will" had an oppo-
site effect. "Strong-willed" Stages 1 and 2 subjects cheated
more, not less, than "weak-willed" subjects, i.e., they had
the "courage of their (amoral) convictions" that it was worth-
while to cheat. "Will," then, is an important factor in moral
behavior, but it is not distinctively moral; it becomes moral
only when informed by mature moral judgment.
Third, Kohlberg reminds us of a point we have already discussed - the
fact that growth in moral judgment is irreversible, whereas moral
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behavior alone is "largely situational and reversible or 'loseable'
in new situations." (CD;672)
Regardless of these practical considerations having to do
with the actual effect of reason on behavior, we must be reminded
of our theory. If we accept the claim that virtue depends on right
action, and action on knowledge, and knowledge on reason, then there
is no question as to the moral value of teaching reason.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Only a fool would despair of human nature because of his
failure to find a truly dutiful act. Such a man might be
compared to a mathematician who, setting out to test his*-
idea of infinite length, seizes upon each long line he
encounters, follows it with rising hopes, and then in an
access of disappointment at always coming to the end, gives
up the notion of infinity itself as a bad bet. For all we
know, the right acts we observe may also be morally worthy
acts.
. . .
Robert Paul Wolff^
I have taken the position that virtue depends on both behav-
ior and thought. We are virtuous only if we do the morally right
thing, and only if we do so with full knowledge of what we are doing
and of the reason why it is the right choice. Together, these two
kinds of knowledge may or may not be sufficient to cause right action.
They are in any case necessary. Reason and experience may or may not
be sufficient for achieving the required knowledge. Again, both are
necessary.
I have discounted other possible variables, most notably the
factor of "will power" as something distinct from the energy and
often courage it takes to acknowledge practical truths and make them
intelligible. Since one of the factors necessary for knowledge
(i.e., experience) can never be fully controlled, it cannot be demon-
strated, when wrong behavior occurs, that some such additional con-
dition is still to be met. Rather than trying to resolve an
117
irresolvable issue, I think it is important for the teacher of vir-
tue to consider how the conditions that are clearly necessary and
to a great extent within our control can best be fulfilled, and to
act on the provisional belief that knowledge, if it were achieved,
would be sufficient for virtue.
Of the two kinds of knowledge necessary for right action,
one is universally limited because of its temporal nature. We can
deliberately have - or have deliberately provided - some, but not
all, of the experiences required for empirical knowledge of the full
consequences of our actions. The probability that our practical
beliefs are true increases, however, the more we are able to support
our predictions with reasoned observations. The habit of making such
observations, at least, can be taught. Given the opportunity and
incentive to practice doing so, we increase our skill in noticing
things and in organizing our ideas about the things we notice. Each
skill reinforces the other; experimental and logico-mathematical
knowledge develop interdependently . Indirectly, by being taught to
observe and to reflect, we can be taught to learn, to the greatest
extent practicable in each instance, just what we are doing, and
what we want to be doing, and whether or not they are the same.
The second kind of knowledge is universally achievable, at
least in theory, and very likely in practice. If we cannot know
what we are doing, we can know what we ideally ought to be doing.
Whether or not we are willing to let the concept of theoretical
knowledge include not only knowledge about what is given, but also
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"knowledge" of what is desirable, both kinds of "knowledge" have in
common their dependence on the achievement of a certain structural
level of thought. Given a sufficiently advanced form of logic, it
is possible for a teacher to provide the kinds of experiences that
enable a student not only to grasp the laws of science, but to inte-
grate his values and others' into a similarly complete, operational
system, governed by a constant, universal moral principle.
Fundamental to both the theoretical and empirical knowledge
required for virtue is the ability to reason at a "formal opera-
tional" level. With this ability and the experience of attempting
to resolve certain kinds of moral problems in the most reasonable
way, we can achieve "knowledge of the Good." With this ability, and,
in addition, the experience that bears on our particular choices of
action, we are in a position to implement our moral theory and to
bring about good results knowingly.
Formal reason is not likely to develop without deliberate
guidance. While an individual may occasionally achieve this level
of logic independently, and while there is no guarantee that with
such guidance he will achieve it at all, there is a great and still
largely untried opportunity to influence cognitive development in a
positive way. Again, it is a question of providing experience with
certain kinds of intellectual tasks. Beyond this, it appears that
one needs only the universal disposition to maintain integrity and
equilibrium in order to reach a mature level of reasoning.
Reason, if not the only condition necessary for virtue, is
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clearly the crucial condition. Experiences of a certain kind, and
of a kind that can be provided, are in turn crucial for the develop-
ment of both cognitive and moral reasoning. We must think of moral
education, like every other kind of education, as not so much a
matter of furnishing final answers as one of providing skills and
opportunities for investigating problems. To the extent that it
depends upon skill and practice in moral reasoning, virtue can be
taught. The teacher who helps each student profit from the kinds
of experiences appropriate to his particular level of intellectual
and moral growth, and to take personal responsibility for his deci-
sions, is the one who most significantly advances both the knowledge
and the practice of virtue.
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